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ARTICLE 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility as Global 
Public Law: Third Party Rankings as 
Regulation by Information*
CHERIE METCALF 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Transnational firms have increasingly become the focus of 
attention as active participants in the process of generating and 
implementing law and norms internationally.1
 
 * Assistant Professor, Queen’s University, Faculty of Law.  Initial work on 
this project was completed during the author’s LL.M. studies at Yale; support 
from a Fulbright / OAS Ecology grant is gratefully acknowledged.  Conference 
travel funding from the Law Foundation of Ontario to present earlier drafts of 
the paper is also gratefully acknowledged.  Thanks for helpful comments and 
suggestions to participants at the Canadian Economics Association Meetings, 
Canadian Law & Economics Association Meetings, U of T Law and Economics 
Workshop, Queen’s Law and Economics Workshop, Anita Anand, Howard 
Bodenhorn, Patrick Coe, Ian Keay, and Roberta Romano.  All remaining errors 
and omissions are the responsibility of the author. 
  The world’s 
 1. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, From Moral Obligation to International 
Law: Disclosure Systems, Markets and the Regulation of Multinational 
Corporations, 39 GEO. J. INT’L L. 591, 592-93 (2008) (describing the role of 
multinational firms in creating a flexible new governance-style set of 
substantive obligations tracking “public” goals, reinforced by a hard 
international law regime of monitoring and disclosure); see also Naomi Cahn & 
Anthony Gambino, Towards a Typology of Corporate Responsibility in Different 
Governance Contexts: What to do in the Absence of Responsible Country 
Governance, 39 GEO.J.INT’L L. 655 (contextual approach to possible use of 
international law to encourage transnational corporations to pursue “public” 
goals and values); Michael P. Vandenbergh & Mark Cohen, Climate Change 
Governance: Boundaries and Leakage, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming 2010) 
(outlining the role of transnational firms in providing private governance of 
“public” problem of global climate change regulation); Natasha A. Affolder, The 
Private Life of Environmental Treaties, 103 AM. J. INT’L. L. 510 (2009) 
(explaining the role of multinational firms in directly implementing and 
observing public international law treaties); RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS: SELF-
GOVERNANCE AND LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS (Olaf Dilling 
et. al. eds., 2008). 
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largest companies are increasingly undertaking voluntary 
commitments that overlap with goals and standards drawn from 
within the realm of traditionally public regulation.2  Current 
activity by transnational corporations commonly features 
commitments to labor standards, environmental responsibility, 
and governance practices, as prominent elements of firms’ 
commitments.3  The geographic reach of the world’s largest 
companies, combined with a lack of corresponding international 
regulatory authority, raises the question of whether voluntary 
self-regulation by firms through corporate social responsibility 
can operate as an effective channel for transnational norm 
implementation.  While some are optimistic about the potential 
for firms to voluntarily undertake commitments that will aid in 
resolution of global public law problems,4
 
 2. The majority of the world’s largest companies now report on their 
corporate responsibility commitments. See KPMG, KPMG INTERNATIONAL 
SURVEY OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING 2008 14 (2008), available at 
http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Docume
nts/International-corporate-responsibility-survey-2008.pdf [hereinafter KPMG 
2008] (finding that 79% of G250 now produce stand-alone sustainability reports, 
which is an increase in reporting relative to previous years); KPMG, KPMG 
INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING 2005 9 (2005), 
available at www.kpmg.com.au/Portals/0/KPMG %20Survey%202005_3.pdf 
[hereinafter KPMG 2005] (finding that 64% of the G250 reported on Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) activity in 2004, compared with 45% in 2002).  A 
substantial share of these large companies referenced international instruments 
connected with public international law and actors; in 2008, 40% of the G250 
made explicit reference to the UN Global Compact, 24% referred to the ILO Core 
Labor Conventions and 21% the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
See KPMG 2008 at 29. 
 others are doubtful that 
the corporate social responsibility movement will provide any 
 3. See Codes of Conduct: Expanded Review of Their Contents 8 (Org. for 
Econ. Cooperation and Dev., Working Papers on International Investment, 
Working Paper No. 2001/6, 2001) (the governance practices extend to anti-
corruption and anti-bribery measures targeting the integrity of public 
governance as well as the ethical integrity of the firm’s own conduct). 
 4. See, e.g., DANIEL C. ESTY & ANDREW S. WINSTON, GREEN TO GOLD: HOW 
SMART COMPANIES USE ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY TO INNOVATE, CREATE VALUE, 
AND BUILD COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 54-55 (2006) (arguing that environmentally 
responsible strategies can also be profitable and lead to competitive advantage 
for firms); see also Vandenbergh & Cohen, supra note 1, at 33 (arguing that 
private governance via the Carbon Disclosure Project, if extended to firm supply 
chains, could be effective in mitigating climate change in the absence of binding 
public international law commitments by states). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss1/2
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meaningful constraint on firm behavior and consequently offers a 
poor prospect as a governance channel.5
There are two major concerns surrounding the viability of 
voluntary corporate social responsibility activity by firms as a 
global governance mechanism.
 
6
Alongside the growth in voluntary corporate social 
responsibility activity by firms, both private and public actors 
have begun to try and influence corporate actors directly and to 
  The primary concern is whether 
this activity is economically sustainable for firms.  If corporate 
social responsibility commitments simply impose costs on firms 
without any financial benefits, they are unlikely to act as a long-
term vehicle guiding firms to adopt strategies that are in line 
with the goals and values of public law.  Secondly, a related 
concern is whether firms’ commitments can be accurately 
assessed in the international marketplace.  Even if corporate 
social responsibility would be economically feasible for firms, 
problems of asymmetric information, moral hazard, and adverse 
selection may render commitments meaningless and limit market 
incentives for firms to engage on a long-term basis.  These 
considerations would tend to render voluntary commitments by 
firms ineffective as potential mechanisms for global regulation in 
relation to the public law mandates of corporate social 
responsibility. 
 
 5. See Helen Keller, Corporate Codes of Conduct and their Implementation: 
The Question of Legitimacy 53-58 (2006), available at 
www.yale.edu/macmillan/Heken_Keller_Paper.pdf (describing corporate social 
responsibility codes as toothless marketing exercises); see also Laura Dubinsky, 
The Fox Guarding the Chicken Coop: Garment Industry Monitoring in Los 
Angeles, in CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITIES AND LABOR RIGHTS: CODES OF CONDUCT 
IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 160, 161, 170 (Gill Seyfang et. al. eds., 2002) (outlining 
the ineffectiveness of corporate social responsibility commitments to labor 
standards). 
 6. Another key consideration is the degree of overlap between the voluntary 
commitments of firms and the underlying problems that would ordinarily call 
for regulation, such as use of common resources.  The present study is primarily 
concerned with the potential viability of private commitments by firms and the 
effectiveness of attempts by third parties to regulate this activity through the 
provision of information.  If voluntary commitments are either unsustainable or 
ineffective, then there is less need for concern about how well they may serve 
the functions of public regulation. 
3
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make corporate social responsibility commitments more robust.7  
Public actors, such as the Organization for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations 
(UN), have provided templates for corporate social responsibility 
that are intended to serve as common substantive reference 
points.8  Private actors have also developed standards and 
rankings that often draw on these and other “public law” 
reference points to compare firms and communicate relative 
performance to potential consumers and investors.9  The 
intervention of private third-party actors engaged in standard-
setting and bench-marking raises the question of whether this 
form of “regulation through information” can be an effective 
alternative to more traditional public means of legal enforcement, 
which are lacking in the international realm in relation to many 
of the commitments firms undertake.10
 
 7. See, e.g., Margaret Blair, Cynthia A. Williams & Li-Wen Lin, The Roles of 
Standardization, Certification and Assurance Services in Global Commerce 20-
21 (Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper 08-16, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1128143 (discussing the role of third party standards 
and monitoring in making corporate voluntary commitments effective in the 
absence of direct regulation, although paper focuses on implications for vertical 
integration of businesses in international setting). 
 
 8. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., OECD GUIDELINES FOR 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf; see also THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org (last visited Oct. 24, 2010) (The Global 
Compact is a much less detailed collection of principles for sound business 
conduct, drawn from key UN instruments). 
 9. Some prominent examples include the Dow Jones Sustainability Index 
(for investments) and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) (for firms reporting 
on corporate social responsibility).  The Global Reporting Initiative appears to 
be emerging as a dominant standard for corporate social responsibility 
reporting. See KPMG 2008, supra note 2, at 38 (noting that in 2008 over 77% of 
the G250 reporting companies referred to the GRI framework).  In 2010, the UN 
Global Compact and GRI announced a new collaboration to integrate the 
substantive goals of the Compact within the reporting framework of the GRI. 
See The Amsterdam Global Conference on Sustainability and Transparency, UN 
Global Compact and GRI Announce New Collaboration (May 28, 2010), 
http://www.amsterdamgriconference.org/ index.php?id=39&item=37. 
 10. See e.g., Backer, supra note 1, at 593 (urging development of hard 
international law to encourage monitoring and disclosure of firms’ 
commitments); see also David W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting as 
Informational Regulation: A Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 379 (2005) (discussing the role of information disclosure as a form of 
regulation, particularly focusing on the potential of the GRI as a regulatory form 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss1/2
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This paper examines Fortune Magazine’s “Corporate Social 
Responsibility” rankings as a case study to provide empirical 
evidence in relation to these questions.  The Fortune rankings 
provide comparative information about the corporate social 
responsibility performance of the world’s largest companies.  The 
paper uses an event study methodology to examine the market 
response to the rankings.  The results of the event study provide 
information about whether the rankings themselves are perceived 
as providing information important to the value of the firms.  
Assessment of investor responses to the Fortune rankings also 
provides evidence about whether corporate social responsibility 
performance is viewed as enhancing the profitability of 
companies, and whether market pressure will tend to force 
“under-performing”11
The paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, I review in 
more detail the theory of voluntary self-regulation in the form of 
undertaking corporate social responsibility commitments.  In 
particular, I consider the links between voluntary activity by 
firms and global public law, and also briefly review the economic 
issues at the heart of debates over whether corporate social 
responsibility is viable.  In Section 3, I discuss previous empirical 
work on the profitability of corporate social responsibility, as well 
as the effectiveness of information provision as a regulatory 
strategy to set the present study in context.  Section 4 describes 
the Fortune rankings.  Section 5 provides a discussion of the 
event study methodology applied in the paper.  Section 6 presents 
the estimation and results, and Section 7 offers conclusions and 
suggestions for future research. 
 firms to improve their performance or 
expand their commitments. 
 
 
of disclosure and arguing that mandatory domestic disclosure laws would 
enhance the regulatory effects of such formal, voluntary reporting). 
 11. The relative performance depends on the extent to which the firms have 
internalized the criteria incorporated in Fortune’s ranking scheme.  The content 
of the scheme is discussed in Section 4 below. 
5
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2 THE THEORY OF CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
2.1 Corporate Social Responsibility as Global Public Law 
One of the features of current corporate social responsibility 
activity by large transnational corporations is its focus on 
traditional subjects of public law regulation.  Contemporary 
surveys of corporate social responsibility reporting indicate that 
most companies provide “sustainability” reports documenting 
their social, environmental and economic performance.12
A significant component of firms’ corporate social 
responsibility activity is linked to respect for individual rights.  
For example, broad commitments to human rights, as well as 
more specific attention to labor rights, are common features of the 
Codes of Conduct firms adopt to outline their voluntary 
commitments.
 
13  Firms report on their performance in 
implementing basic “labor rights,” such as equal opportunity and 
non-discrimination, as well as prohibitions on forced and child 
labor.14  Firms also frequently commit to providing reasonable 
working conditions for their employees, including workplace 
safety, and in many cases extending to more fundamental 
individual rights of collective bargaining and free association.15
 
 12. See KPMG 2005, supra note 2, at 9. 
  
 13. See Codes of Conduct: Expanded Review of Their Contents, supra note 3 
at 10 (noting that 25% of Codes in their sample explicitly referenced “human 
rights”); see also id. (indicating that 60% of the firms sampled included 
commitments to labor rights); KPMG 2005, supra note 2, at 24 (stating that 
firms’ corporate social responsibility reports also include references to human 
rights and labor rights, and noting that 51% of firms’ reports contained general 
commitments to human rights and that roughly two thirds of firms’ reports 
indicated commitment to equal opportunity and diversity as labor rights, while 
just under one third reported support for prohibitions on child or forced labor); 
KPMG 2008, supra note 2, at 29 (Figure 4.5 indicates use of  UN Global 
Compact (40%), ILO Core Conventions (24%) and UN Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (21%) in G250 reporting). 
 14. See KPMG 2005, supra note 2, at 24. 
 15. See Codes of Conduct: Expanded Review of Their Contents, supra note 3, 
at 10 (indicating that 75% of sample Codes contain commitments to working 
conditions); KPMG 2005, supra note 2, at 24 (finding that just under one third of 
corporate social responsibility reports indicated support for collective bargaining 
and free association). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss1/2
02 METCALFMACROV7 1/5/2011  5:46 AM 
2010] CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 151 
 
The protection and promotion of individual rights is a core 
function of public law, and in most international agreements is 
recognized as a duty on states.  The assumption of responsibility 
by transnational corporations in relation to individual rights 
represents one strand of their engagement as private actors 
promoting public law norms through voluntary activity. 
Another prominent focus of voluntary activity by firms is in 
the realm of environmental stewardship.16  A diverse array of 
objectives constitute firms’ environmental commitments, but a 
common focal point is sustainable development goals, which 
include environmentally responsible products and production 
methods, responsiveness to community concerns, recycling, 
conservation, waste management practices, and energy 
conservation.17  Environmental self-regulation by firms is 
distinguished by a greater degree of transparency than other 
types of voluntary activity.  Firms are more likely to describe 
environmental corporate social responsibility goals in terms of 
measurable targets and to disclose information about progress to 
the public.18  The recent attention transnational firms have paid 
to the issue of global warming illustrates this characteristic.  In 
2005, over 85% of the G25019 addressed climate change in their 
corporate social responsibility reports and 67% measured and 
reported on their green house gas emissions.20
 
 16. See KPMG 2005, supra note 2, at 9, showing that prior to 2004 most 
corporate social responsibility reports focused exclusively on environmental, 
health and safety issues (73% of reports for the G250 had this focus in 2002). 
  The 
 17. See Codes of Conduct: Expanded Review of Their Contents, supra note 3, 
at 12 (noting that the dominant commitment in Codes in the OECD Survey 
related to the environment was to comply with national laws). 
 18. See id. (stating that 29% of Codes of Conduct touching on environmental 
concerns contain this commitment). 
 19. The G250 are the 250 largest industrial corporations in the world, as 
measured by revenue.  Fortune compiles a list of the 500 largest companies 
annually; for lists for sample years 2004-2006, see Fortune 500, 2004 Full List, 
FORTUNE, Apr. 5, 2004, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/ 
fortune500_archive/full/2004; Fortune 500, 2005 Full List, FORTUNE, Apr. 18, 
2005, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500_archive/ 
full/2005; Fortune 500, 2006 Full List, FORTUNE, Apr. 17, 2006, available at 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2006/full_list/index.html. 
 20. See KPMG 2005, supra note 2, at 27 (reporting on direct emissions).  In 
the survey for 2008, 56% of the G250 surveyed were reporting on their carbon 
footprint. See KPMG 2008, supra note 2, at 56. 
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environmental corporate social responsibility activity of 
transnational firms overlaps with public law in its concern for 
sustainable development, which inherently involves balancing the 
private and social costs and benefits of activity with anticipated 
environmental consequences.  Practical commitments such as 
recycling and hazardous waste management address the 
externalities arising from firms’ private activity.  
Characteristically, externalities give rise to market failure and 
are a focus of public regulatory intervention.21
Consideration of one final category of activity helps to 
illustrate the overlap between current self-regulation by firms 
and public law.  Recently, transnational firms have been 
increasingly focused on making commitments to protect the 
integrity of public decision-making as part of their corporate 
social responsibility activity.  For example, issues of bribery and 
corruption have assumed an increasingly prominent profile in 
firms’ corporate codes, reporting and governance mechanisms.
  The focus on 
global warming further illustrates the coincidence of 
environmental corporate volunteerism with public law, as global 
climate change presents a classic problem of commons 
management that is subject to collective action problems at the 
international level. 
22
 
 21. Direct government regulation is the solution to externality problems in 
the Pigouvian tradition, while creation and enforcement of complete property 
rights can produce optimal outcomes in a purely Coasian analysis.  In either 
case, some form of supporting public law intervention is required to establish 
the legal framework to address the environmental spillovers from firms’ activity. 
  
Commitments to disclosure and transparency related to firms’ 
voluntary commitments, either directly or through the use of 
assurance services, are another aspect of firms’ activity in this 
 22. See Codes of Conduct: Expanded Review of Their Contents, supra note 3, 
at 8 (reporting that about 23% of the firms in their 2001 sample included Code 
commitments directed at combating bribery and corruption); see also EXPERTS IN 
RESPONSIBLE INV. SOLUTIONS, CORPORATE CODES OF BUSINESS ETHICS: AN 
INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF BRIBERY AND ETHICAL STANDARDS IN COMPANIES 6 
(2005) (identifying the use of whistle-blowing systems, anti-bribery policies, 
prohibitions on political donations, and the adoption and monitoring of ethics 
policies as corporate social responsibility practices adopted by companies on the 
FTSE All World Developed Index targeted at corruption and bribery). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss1/2
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area.23
Corporate social responsibility activity by transnational 
corporations not only overlaps with the subjects of public law, but 
also connects directly with the norms of public international law.  
The most obvious examples can be found in corporate social 
responsibility codes and reports that explicitly reference 
instruments drawn from public international law.  A substantial 
proportion of the reports of large transnational corporations 
directly reference the UN Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, International Labour Organization (ILO) Core Labor 
Conventions, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
(MNEs), or the UN Global Compact as benchmarks for their 
activities.
  A major function of public law is to provide mechanisms 
to insure the integrity of public decision-making in order to 
constrain actors within the bounds of their legal authority and 
prevent the capture of public decision-making authority by 
special interests.  The anti-bribery, corruption control, and 
transparency goals, adopted as part of transnational firms’ 
corporate social responsibility activities, represent self-regulation 
efforts directed at achieving these public law goals. 
24  The Universal Declaration and ILO Core 
Conventions are foundational sources of norms in the realm of 
public international law.  The OECD Guidelines and Global 
Compact are not instruments of public international law, but 
incorporate principles drawn directly from public international 
law.  For example, the UN Global Compact requires firms to 
adopt and support ten principles that are directly linked to UN 
supported instruments, including the Universal Declaration, ILO 
Core Labor Conventions, Rio Declaration, and UN Convention on 
Corruption.25
 
 23. See Codes of Conduct: Expanded Review of Their Contents, supra note 3, 
at 11-12; KPMG 2005, supra note 3, at 30. 
  Instruments of public international law can also be 
 24. See KPMG 2008, supra note 2, at 29 (indicating that of the G250 
corporate social responsibility reports, 21% referred to the Universal 
Declaration, 24% referred to ILO Core Standards, 13% referred to OECD 
Guidelines and 40% referred to the Global Compact). 
 25. See Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Proposes Global 
Compact on Human Rights, Labour, Environment, in Address to World 
Economic Forum in Davos, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/6881 (Jan. 31, 1999), 
available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990201.sgsm6881.html; 
see also Overview of the UN Global Compact, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (last visited Nov. 18, 
9
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influential by providing reference points and guiding the 
direction of corporate social responsibility activity by firms.  An 
illustrative example is the influence of the UN Framework 
Convention for Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol on firms’ 
voluntary climate change activity, which has a matching focus on 
measuring greenhouse gas emissions, and also targets to 
benchmark progress in achieving socially responsible goals. 
The influence of norms from the realm of public international 
law is not confined to their direct application in firms’ voluntary 
activity.  Another important connection arises through the 
influence of third party standards that draw on, or connect to, 
norms of public international law.  An illustrative example is the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). The Global Reporting Initiative 
is a standardized framework for reporting on corporate social 
responsibility activities developed by an NGO-led coalition that 
also includes firms, academics, accounting firms, and business 
associations, among others.26  The index is explicitly designed to 
complement the UN Global Compact and has a stated goal of 
providing a universal standard by which firms can measure their 
performance that will reflect the normative goals of the Global 
Compact.27
 
2010) (on goals and strategy of the Global Compact); The Ten Principles, UNITED 
NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/ 
TheTenPrinciples/index.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2010) (discussing the ten 
principles and indicating their relationship to key UN instruments). 
  Other third party standards, such as the 
AccountAbility framework for assessing corporate social 
responsibility that was adopted in the Fortune magazine ratings, 
 26. See What is GRI?, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, 
http://www.globalreporting.org/AboutGRI/WhatIsGRI/ (last visited Nov. 14, 
2010).  For discussion of the development and structure of the GRI, see Allen L. 
White, Why We Need Global Standards for Corporate Disclosure, 69 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 177-82 (2006). See also Case, supra note 10 at 397-401. 
 27. See Alliances, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, http://www.globalreporting 
.org/AboutGRI/WhatIsGRI/Alliances/GRIAlliancesPage.htm (last visited Nov. 18 
2010) (listing UN Global Compact as a UN instrument that has “synergies” with 
the GRI).  For further discussion of the connection between the normative goals 
of the Global Compact and the reporting mechanism of the GRI, see THE GLOBAL 
COMPACT & GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, MAKING THE CONNECTION: THE GRI 
GUIDELINES AND THE UNGC COMMUNICATION ON PROGRESS (summarizing before 
mentioned connection, notably on page 3) available at  
http://www.globalreporting.org/NR/rdonlyres/A72A4645-B6FA-40B5-A1EE-
A64E6F0CFBB2/0/260607_COP_MTC.PDF. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss1/2
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draw on norms of public international law as criteria for 
constructing their own assessments of the quality of firms’ 
corporate social responsibility.28
Voluntary commitments by firms under the broad rubric of 
“corporate social responsibility” target subjects that have 
traditionally been viewed as the foci of public law.  These 
commitments by firms are also both directly and indirectly linked 
to normative commitments drawn from public international law.  
Corporate social responsibility is a potentially important 
mechanism for the transmission of public law norms in the global 
sphere, particularly as norm setting in the realm of public 
international law often has relatively weak implementation or 
enforcement mechanisms.  Corporate social responsibility 
commitments by transnational firms offer a complementary 
means by which the norms of public international law can be 
realized and implemented in a global setting.  Effective 
commitments may also self-regulate activities of transnational 
corporations with important public law dimensions that are 
commonly viewed as resistant to control through unilateral 
domestic legislation.
 
29
The potential for corporate social responsibility activity by 
transnational firms to achieve this promise depends on whether 
these voluntary commitments are effective.  The question of 
effectiveness relates to both the economic incentives for firms to 
engage in meaningful commitments and the issue of whether the 
market can provide a suitable mechanism for rewarding and 
enforcing the commitments firms make. 
 
2.2 The Economics of Corporate Social Responsibility 
Whether or not corporate social responsibility is a profitable 
activity for corporations is hotly contested.30
 
 28. See infra Section 4 for discussion of Fortune’s Rankings. 
  There are three 
 29. For example, the issue of labor rights and standards poses difficult 
competitive concerns in a global market. 
 30. See, e.g., ESTY & WINSTON, supra note 4, at 55-58 (making a general case 
for the potential profitability of adopting “green” business strategy).  For the 
perspective of Milton Friedman, perhaps the most famous skeptic of corporate 
social responsibility as a profitable strategy for firms, see MILTON FRIEDMAN, 
11
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main channels through which corporate social responsibility has 
the potential to enhance the profitability of firms. 
Corporate social responsibility largely overlaps with the 
phenomena of private provision of public goods by individuals, 
but intermediated through consumption and investment markets.  
The underlying preferences of consumers and investors are 
important to understanding whether or not corporate social 
responsibility will be profitable.  If consumers and investors have 
tastes for the corporate social responsibility dimensions of goods 
or firms (e.g. as investments), then voluntary commitments can 
be a means of product differentiation that allows firms to earn 
supra-normal profits.  A number of economists have put forward 
theories of individual preferences that would produce demand for 
such “bundled” public-private goods.  Sen has identified a theory 
of preferences under which consumer and investor choices in the 
market would reflect prior “commitments” or “sympathies” 
directed at the provision of “public goods.”31  Akerlof and Kranton 
have developed an economic model of “identity” that would also 
support consumer/investor choice favoring corporate social 
responsibility aligned products.32  However, an implication of 
their model is that identity driven CSR demand depends on the 
strength of private preferences combined with social influences 
that are only triggered when corporate social responsibility is an 
observable aspect of consumer/investor choice.33
 
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (Univ. of Chi. Press, 2002) (1962) (arguing that this is 
largely a way in which management diverts wealth from shareholders). 
  The identity 
model thus reveals an important potential limitation in firms’ 
ability to capitalize on corporate social responsibility through 
product differentiation if that dimension of their products is not 
readily apparent.  Empirical evidence offers some support for 
claims that consumers and investors may make choices that 
reflect willingness to pay for corporate social responsibility 
 31. See Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral 
Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 327 (1977); see also 
AMARTYA K. SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM (Harvard Univ. Press 2002) 
[hereinafter SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM]. 
 32. See George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, Economics and Identity, 140 
Q. J. ECON. 715, 716 (2000). 
 33. See id.  This is an implication in relation to corporate social responsibility 
that flows from the structure of Akerlof and Kranton’s model. 
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preferences.34
Corporate social responsibility may also be profitable if it 
offers a means of preempting costly regulations or anticipating 
the regulatory environment in which the firm operates in a 
manner that minimizes future costs.  This view of corporate social 
responsibility is reflected in the views of transnational 
corporations themselves.  For example, John Browne, a former 
CEO of BP, a transnational corporate social responsibility 
“leader,” described the development of the company’s internal 
GHG emissions trading scheme as a way to get “a seat at the 
table and influence future rules.”
  However, it is not clear that this form of product 
differentiation will always be profitable. 
35  The approach of third parties 
also confirms the viewpoint that corporate social responsibility 
can be seen as a way to strategically position a company to 
address future regulatory requirements.36
 
 34. See, e.g., KPMG 2005, supra note 2, at 18 (stating that 74% of the G250 
firms surveyed about corporate social responsibility indicated that “economic 
considerations” were behind their activity, and referenced specific factors such 
as “access to capital / shareholder value” (39%), “brand or reputation” (27%), and 
“market position” (21%)).  Consumer surveys have also documented willingness 
to pay for consumer products aligned with corporate social responsibility 
commitments to labor and to boycott goods violating “fair” labor practices. See 
Kimberly Ann Elliott & Richard B. Freeman, White Hats or Don Quixotes? 
Human Rights Vigilantes in the Global Economy, in EMERGING LABOR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Richard B. Freeman et al. eds., 
2005); Orly Lobel, Sustainable Capitalism or Ethical Transnationalism: 
Offshore Production and Economic Development, 17 J. ASIAN ECON. 56, 58 (2006); 
Michael T. Rock, Public Disclosure of the Sweatshop Practices of American 
Multinational Garment/Shoe Makers/Retailers: Impacts on their Stock Prices, 7 
COMPETITION & CHANGE 23, 24 (2003).  Recent data indicates that approximately 
ten percent of U.S. capital market investment is subject to some form of ethical 
screen.  This puts the value of the “ethical investment” market at some $2.3 
trillion dollars. See Telis Demos, Beyond the Bottom Line: Our Second Ranking 
of Global 500 Companies, FORTUNE, Oct. 23, 2006, available at 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2006/10/30/8391850/in
dex.htm. 
  Academic 
commentators have identified this strategic, competitive aspect as 
a potential economic incentive for firms to engage in corporate 
social responsibility as a preemptive response to future 
 35. See ESTY & WINSTON, supra note 4, at 120. 
 36. The Dow Jones Sustainability index is based on the idea that recognition 
of long-term sustainability challenges will enhance shareholder value in the 
long run by enhancing the competitive position of firms. See BUSINESS AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF DOCUMENTS 528 (Radu Mares ed., 2004). 
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regulation.37
Finally, corporate social responsibility may enhance 
profitability through increased employee productivity or reduced 
labor costs.  One possible link between corporate social 
responsibility and profitability may come from activity that 
provides direct benefits to employees.  These “gifts” in excess of a 
competitive wage may produce a reciprocal benefit for the firm in 
the form of enhanced productivity.  The overall efficiency of 
production can be enhanced despite deviation from a strictly 
competitive, cost-minimizing approach to labor compensation.
  However, this aspect of corporate social 
responsibility may lead to uncertain impacts on profitability.  
Much depends on whether firms perceive risks accurately and 
whether investors and corporations perceive future risks 
similarly.  If firms prepare for the “wrong” environment, then 
there is a risk that profitability will be hurt by pre-commitment 
through corporate social responsibility.  Furthermore, if investors 
do not share the corporation’s view of its future operating 
environment, corporate social responsibility may dilute the value 
of the company. 
38  
Another approach to corporate social responsibility as a profitable 
strategy through its impact on labor costs can arise where the 
activity is tied to “moral” preferences held by prospective 
employees.39
 
 37. See ESTY & WINSTON, supra note 4, at 118-20. 
  The adoption of corporate social responsibility 
commitments can serve as a way to screen employees and allow 
firms to pay reduced wages or gain loyalty and productivity 
 38. See generally George A. Akerlof, Labor Contracts as a Partial Gift 
Exchange, 97 Q. J. ECON. 543 (1983).  For empirical support, see Lobel, supra 
note 34 (discussing labor productivity results for Costco and Walmart). See also 
Ernst Fehr, George Kirchsteiger & Arno Reidl, Does Fairness Prevent Markets 
from Clearing? An Experimental Investigation, 108 Q. J. ECON. 437 (1993) 
(describing experimental results confirming that above market compensation 
can be efficient). 
 39. This strand of corporate social responsibility profitability analysis 
essentially draws on the “moral” or “social welfare” enhancing preference held 
by individuals as manifested through employment markets. See, e.g., SEN, 
RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM, supra note 31; Akerlof & Kranton, supra note 32; 
Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, Understanding Social Preferences with 
Simple Tests, 117 Q. J. ECON. 817 (2002). 
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thereby enhancing profitability.40
Skeptics of corporate social responsibility point to a number 
of potential problems.  If it represents a move away from a 
strictly shareholder value model of management, corporate social 
responsibility may make the decisions of managers more complex 
and less transparent.  This can lead to management following its 
own preferences and incurring “wasteful” expenditures that 
reduce the value of the firm.
  While there are plausible 
efficiency arguments on the labor market side for corporate social 
responsibility, the economic sustainability of this rationale is 
again unclear as a theoretical matter. 
41  Managerial decisions may become 
more arbitrary and undermine profitability.42  Even if there is a 
role for “responsible” firms, alignment with corporate social 
responsibility preferences as a stakeholder welfare maximization 
model may lead to a reduction in the return on equity in these 
firms.43
 
 40. For a formal model of labor market screening based on the corporate 
social responsibility preferences of employees, see Kjell Arne Brekke & Karine 
Nyborg, Attracting Responsible Employees: Green Production as Labor Market 
Screening, 30 RESOURSE & ENERGY ECON. 509 (2008); ROBERT H. FRANK, WHAT 
PRICE THE MORAL HIGH GROUND (2003) (providing empirical support for a 
compensating wage differential of non-profit company employees in the form of 
the socially responsible focus of the companies); see also KPMG 2005, supra note 
2, at 18 (finding that 47% of G250 firms cited “employee motivation” as a driver 
for corporate social responsibility and linking this to a ‘war for talent’); KPMG 
2008, supra note 2 at 18 (in 2008 “Employee Motivation” cited as a driver by 
52% of G250); ESTY & WINSTON, supra note 4, at 137 (providing anecdotal 
evidence that corporate social responsibility is related to the ability to attract 
employees with “green” sensibilities). 
  If corporate social responsibility leads to this result, then 
the co-existence of these firms and “ordinary” firms will be 
 41. See e.g. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to 
Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 13, 1970; see also FRANK H. 
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE 
LAW 38 (1991) (support for general view that shareholder primacy model is the 
workable and efficient approach to corporate management). 
 42. See Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory and the 
Corporate Objective Function, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 9 (2001). 
 43. This result could arise both if corporate social responsibility is costly/not 
profitable for the managerial reasons above and if investors are willing to 
sacrifice some financial return on their investments for non-financial rewards in 
the form of “moral” satisfaction. 
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problematic, since firms focusing on corporate social 
responsibility may become a takeover target.44
The profitability and economic sustainability of corporate 
social responsibility activity by firms is not clearly established by 
theory.  However, the potential for corporate social responsibility 
to operate as a significant channel for global governance depends 
on its economic viability.  Whether or not markets perceive 
corporate social responsibility as enhancing the value of firms is 
an important empirical question.
 
45
Aside from the issue of whether corporate social 
responsibility is profitable in and of itself, it is questionable 
whether the global marketplace will provide a suitable forum for 
trade in CSR quality differentiated goods and investments.  The 
classic work of Akerlof established the risk that trade in products 
ostensibly differentiated by unobservable quality can lead to 
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection that can destroy 
the incentives to produce high quality products.
 
46  In the 
corporate social responsibility context, claims that firms’ 
commitments are empty marketing exercises reflect the view that 
firms have incentives to cheat on their promises and deliver little 
in the way of meaningful change in their activity.47
 
 44. See Jean Tirole, Corporate Governance, 69 ECONOMETRICA 1, 3 (2001). 
  Unless the 
commitments of firms can be made credible, there is little 
 45. Another important question relates to the scope of viable corporate social 
responsibility relative to “true” public law regulation.  While effective corporate 
social responsibility commitments may overlap to a degree with the objects and 
purposes of public law, the fit is unlikely to be perfect.  For a more detailed 
exploration of the relationship between corporate social responsibility and public 
law, see Cherie Metcalf, Corporate Codes of Conduct, International Trade and 
the Private Diffusion of Public Law Norms: Limits and Possibilities (2010) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  The focus of the present inquiry 
is limited to the effectiveness of commitments actually adopted by firms as part 
of their corporate social responsibility activity. 
 46. See George Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and 
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970); see also Jason Scott 
Johnston, Signaling Social Responsibility: On the Law and Economics of Market 
Incentives for Corporate Environmental Performance 71-73 (Univ. of Pa., Inst. 
for Law and Econ., Research Paper No. 05-16, 2005) (discussing this problem of 
corporate social responsibility  as a “credence good” in relation to environmental 
commitments by firms). 
 47. This is not an uncommon view amongst critics of corporate “self-
regulation.” See, e.g., Dubinsky, supra note 5, at 161; Keller, supra note 5 at 13. 
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incentive to expend any resources engaging in corporate social 
responsibility activity, even for firms that may genuinely intend 
to adhere to their commitments.  The complexity of international 
markets and the supply and distribution networks of 
transnational corporations make observation and monitoring of 
firms’ performance difficult.  However, without some means to 
enhance the credibility and comparability of firms’ corporate 
social responsibility commitments, the potential for CSR to 
operate as a channel for global governance will be severely 
limited. 
One important potential means by which the quality of firms’ 
corporate social responsibility commitments can be assured is 
through third party assessment and rankings.48  The emergence 
of private, common standards as a means of structuring corporate 
social responsibility reporting, such as the GRI, is directed at 
achieving this goal.  The use of privately constructed screens or 
ranking mechanisms to compare the corporate social 
responsibility profiles of firms is another element of this strategy 
to render it potentially effective in the global market.49
 
 48. Other means of addressing the “lemons” problem associated with 
corporate social responsibility include use of disclosure combined with readily 
observable corporate social responsibility commitments, use of assurance 
services for corporate social responsibility reports, monitoring of activity, and 
incorporation of governance mechanisms to facilitate accountability for 
corporate social responsibility quality.  For discussion of these possibilities, see 
Metcalf, supra note 45 (focusing on the use of third party assessment and 
rankings). 
  The 
Fortune Sustainability rankings are an example of the 
application of a private, third party standard to assess firms’ 
corporate social responsibility activity, combined with widespread 
availability of the comparative results.  At this point in time, it is 
not clear whether efforts to provide independent benchmarking of 
firms’ corporate social responsibility activity through rankings 
like Fortune’s will address the potential “lemons” problem.  
However, the empirical results from this study will help shed 
light on whether this mechanism can help render corporate social 
responsibility commitments credible and worthwhile for firms to 
undertake. 
 49. This type of comparative screening and ranking is implicit in privately 
generated screens such as the Dow Jones Sustainability Index and Domini 400. 
17
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3 CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY & THE 
MARKET: RELATED RESEARCH 
There are three central empirical questions at the heart of 
the present inquiry.  Is corporate social responsibility activity 
profitable for firms?  Can third party rankings provide a means of 
making commitments credible?  Will capital market responses 
provide a disciplining force on companies in relation to their 
corporate social responsibility commitments that can take the 
place of traditional enforcement actions? 
The profitability of corporate social responsibility as a 
general matter is deeply contested, and empirical investigation 
has not eliminated this uncertainty.  A number of researchers 
have provided relevant empirical studies.  For example, 
Becchetti, Giacomo and Pinnacchio examine the long-run 
profitability of social responsibility in their study  which 
compares firms in the Domini 400 Social Index portfolio against a 
matching sample of non-CSR firms.50  In that study, the authors 
find that socially responsible firms have higher sales per 
employee accompanied by lower returns on equity, although with 
reduced volatility compared with the non-CSR portfolio.51  
Becchetti et al. interpret their results as weakly supporting the 
conclusion that corporate social responsibility represents a move 
away from the “shareholder primacy” model toward a 
“stakeholder welfare” model.52
The results match those in another recent study of the 
profitability of corporate social responsibility activity by 
Brammer, Brooks and Pavelin.
  This suggests that, in terms of 
pure profitability, “responsible” firms may fare worse than their 
irresponsible counterparts. 
53
 
 50. See generally Leonardo Becchetti, Stefania Di Giacomo & Damiano 
Pinnacchio, Presentation at the XIII Tor Vergata Financial Conference: The 
Impact of Social Responsibility on Productivity and Efficiency of US Listed 
Companies (2004), available at http://art.torvergata.it/bitstream/2108/ 
80/1/210.pdf. 
  In this study, the authors 
 51. Id. at 14 (sales per employee and level of investment returns), 16 
(reduced volatility of returns). 
 52. Id. at 16-17. 
 53. Compare Becchetti, Di Giacomo & Pinnacchio, supra note 51, with 
Stephen Brammer, Chris Brooks & Stephen Pavelin, Corporate Social 
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examine the long-run stock returns of UK firms and relate these 
returns to firm social performance using data from the EIRIS 
investment service screen.  The composite social responsibility 
score is negatively correlated with stock performance.54  The 
EIRIS data on firms’ social responsibility characteristics is 
proprietary, so it is difficult to know exactly how these 
measurements relate to broader investor perceptions of social 
responsibility.  In addition, incomplete data forced Brammer et al. 
to consider only a subset of socially responsible behavior, which 
may undermine the generality of their conclusions about the 
profitability of corporate social responsibility.55
Becchetti and Ciciretti in a follow-up study to their earlier 
work, found that the lower long-run mean returns of socially 
responsible investments are compensated for in terms of relative 
risk; the risk-adjusted rates of returns to CSR and non-CSR 
stocks are not significantly different.
 
56  This work again uses the 
firms included in the Domini 400 Social Index as the socially 
responsible investment portfolio and constructs a matching 
sample to assess the impact of corporate social responsibility on 
returns.57
 
Performance and Stock Returns: UK Evidence from Disaggregate Measures 
(June 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
  As both the Becchetti et al. study and Becchetti and 
Ciciretti’s work focus on the use of the Domini 400 Social index, 
the results may be specific to the vision of social responsibility 
inherent in that index.  An additional potential difficulty lies with 
the construction of the matching sample.  Particularly given the 
long-run comparison, there is a risk that the impact of social 
responsibility may be confounded with other effects that are not 
captured in the criteria used to match the firms. 
 54. See Becchetti, Di Giacomo & Pinnacchio, supra note 51, at 11-13 
(discussing results). 
 55. See Brammer, Brooks & Pavelin, supra note 53, at 7 (using measures for 
community performance, environmental performance and employee 
performance from the EIRIS service). 
 56. See generally Leonardo Becchetti & Rocco Ciciretti, Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Stock Market Performance 14 (Ctr. for Econ. and Int’l 
Studies, Working Paper No. 79, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=897499. 
 57. See id. at 5. 
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In an earlier study, Posnikoff investigated the profitability of 
South African apartheid-related divestment as a socially 
responsible investment decision by firms.58  Posnikoff used an 
event study methodology to assess the market response to 
announcements of divestment by individual companies.  Contrary 
to her expectations, she found that divestment produced 
statistically significant positive excess returns.59  She attributed 
this response to investor tastes for ethical investment, or as a 
reflection of consumer preferences embodied in boycotts of 
companies with South African connections.60  In subsequent 
follow-up studies, this conclusion was questioned by Meznar, 
Nigh, and Kwok, who concluded from their estimates that 
whether firms earned positive abnormal returns upon 
announcing divestment depended on the timing.61  Early movers 
were not rewarded and instead experienced negative abnormal 
returns.  Later on, however, and particularly once the U.S. 
imposed economic sanctions, divestment announcements did 
generate positive returns.62
The prior research provides somewhat mixed evidence on the 
question of whether corporate social responsibility is a profitable 
activity for firms.  The present study will complement prior work 
by broadening the focus on social responsibility to consider an 
additional social responsibility ranking method beyond the EIRIS 
and Domini investment screens.  In addition, the use of an event 
study analysis, made possible by the announcement of annual 
rankings in Fortune, will allow for a more targeted focus on the 
market response to social responsibility.  However, unlike 
  The work on South African 
divestment suggests that there may be a case for profitable 
“ethical” strategies, but it appears highly contingent.  It is also 
unclear how readily one can generalize from the particular 
context of apartheid. 
 
 58. See Judith F. Posnikoff, Divestment from South Africa: They Did Well by 
Doing Good, 15 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 76 (1997). 
 59. Id. at 79,82 (finding positive excess returns under alternative estimation 
strategies). 
 60. See id. 
 61. See Martin B. Meznar, Douglas Nigh & Chuck C.Y. Kwok, 
Announcements of Withdrawal from South Africa Revisited: Making Sense of 
Contradictory Event Study Findings, 41 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 715, 729 (1998). 
 62. See id. (providing this explanation of their results). 
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Posnikoff’s divestment example, the Fortune rankings address 
corporate social responsibility more comprehensively and in 
relation to “ordinary” business practice.  The Fortune rankings 
apply to the companies in the G100, so there is a cross-sectional 
comparison of corporate social responsibility performance 
inherent in the rankings that avoids the difficulty of constructing 
a matched sample. 
A number of recent papers address the question of whether 
third party rankings are viewed by the market as providing 
independent information.63  In one such study, Del Guercio and 
Tkac use an event study methodology to assess the impact of the 
“Morningstar” mutual fund rankings on fund flows.64  The 
authors conclude that changes in the star ranking produce a 
statistically significant effect that can be separated from changes 
in the underlying performance measures.65  Del Guerco and 
Tkacs’ results also indicate that investors punish firms suffering 
a downgrade by imposing negative excess returns in reaction to 
the rating announcement.  In another study, Cheng, Collins and 
Huang also use an event study methodology to address the 
impact of the transparency and disclosure rankings by Standard 
and Poor.66
 
 63. It is implicit in both Becchetti, Di Giacomo & Pinnacchio, supra note 51 
and Becchetti & Cicciretti, supra note 56 that inclusion in the Domini 400 will 
convey meaningful information about a firm’s social responsibility profile. 
  These authors’ results also provide support for the 
claim that third party rankings can be viewed as providing new 
information to the market.  Cheng et al. find that investors 
responded to the Standard and Poor rankings when the rankings 
revealed discrepancies with disclosure in annual reports, bidding 
 64. See Diane Del Guercio & Paula A. Tkac, Star Power: The Effect of 
Morningstar Ratings on Mutual Fund Flow (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 
Working Paper No. 2001-15, 2001). 
 65. Funds are rated on a simple five-star scale.  The results are available 
freely on the internet. See id at 29-30. 
 66. See C.S. Agnes Cheng, Denton Collins & Henry Huang, Investors’ 
Interpretation of the October 15, 2002 Standard & Poor Transparency & 
Disclosure Rankings 14 (Jan. 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author) (the study examines the effect of the ranking of transparency and 
disclosure practices of firms, compiled by the investment firm Standard and 
Poor); see also Sandeep A. Patel and George S. Dallas, Transparency and 
Disclosure: Overview of Methodology and Study Results,(Oct. 16, 2002). 
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down share values.67  Linciano uses an event study methodology 
to address the impact of rating actions by the investment services 
of Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poor on a sample of Italian 
firms.68  She finds that rating downgrades and credit watches 
produce significant negative effects on stock prices, a result that 
mirrors recent findings by other researchers targeting U.S. 
stocks.69
A small group of papers have focused on evaluating the 
significance of rankings in Fortune magazine itself.  Filbeck and 
Preece use both an event study methodology and a long-run 
approach to assess the information provided by Fortune’s Best 100 
Companies to Work for in America annual survey over the period 
from 1987-1999.
 
70  The authors find that inclusion in the ranking 
generates a significant positive abnormal return over the 
announcement period and higher long-run performance in 
comparison with a matched sample of non-award winning 
firms.71  Fortune’s rankings of America’s Most Admired 
Companies have also been the subject of study by academic 
researchers.  For instance, Antunovich and Laster examine the 
long-run returns over the sample period from 1983-1996, sorting 
the firms by decile.  The authors find that the most admired firms 
earn positive abnormal returns, while those in the bottom decile 
experience negative excess returns.72
 
 67. See Cheng, Collins & Huang, supra note 66, at 14. 
  In another study, Chung et 
al. assess these Fortune rankings over the period from 1990-1998, 
considering only the top 10 and bottom 10 firms in the ranking, 
adjusting the returns for risk.  They find little evidence that the 
 68. See generally Nadia Linciano, The Reaction of Stock Prices to Rating 
Changes 1 (July 31, 2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 69. See id. at 2-3. But see Maria Vassalou & Yuhang Xing, Equity Returns 
Following Changes in Default Risk: New Insights into the Informational Content 
of Credit Ratings (EFA 2003 Annual Conference, Paper No. 326, 2003) 
(suggesting that the independent informational content of ratings changes is 
poor, since fundamentals can predict changes in the stock prices as well). 
 70. See generally Greg Filbeck & Dianna Preece, Fortune’s Best 100 
Companies to Work for in America: Do They Work for Shareholders?, 30 J. BUS. 
FIN. & ACCT. 771, 777-79 (2003). 
 71. See id at 784. 
 72. Peter Antunovich & David Laster, Do Investors Mistake a Good Company 
for a Good Investment? 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 60, 1998). 
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Fortune rankings produce any significant effect.73  Finally, 
Filbeck, Gorman and Preece also address the Most Admired 
Companies rankings, calculating and comparing annual returns 
for the top 50-ranked firms, bottom 50-ranked firms and the 
market.  These authors find that the most admired firms 
outperformed the market by a statistically significant margin 
over the period from 1982-1994.74
While prior research clearly establishes the potential for 
independent rankings to convey information to the market, this 
research has not directly targeted the rankings applicable to 
corporate social responsibility investments.  The independent 
content of third party corporate social responsibility rankings is 
an empirical question of critical importance to the debate over 
whether it can be made effective as a global governance 
mechanism.  Prior research indicates potential for rankings 
associated with Fortune to convey independent information to the 
market; this study will build on this prior work in the context of 
corporate social responsibility rankings.  While the results from 
prior Fortune surveys could be interpreted as targeting specific 
aspects of corporate social responsibility in a domestic context, 
the present inquiry focuses on a much broader definition of 
corporate social responsibility, and is more international in scope. 
 
The question of whether capital markets can operate to 
enforce “regulation by information” has been addressed in 
numerous studies.  One strand of research closely related to the 
environmental stewardship prong of corporate social 
responsibility examines whether capital markets respond to 
information about environmentally harmful behavior by firms.  
The evidence is mixed.  In one study, Hamilton examined the 
initial release of information under the Toxic Release Inventory 
(TRI) in the U.S., using an event study methodology, and found a 
statistically significant negative abnormal return for reporting 
 
 73. This manuscript is discussed in Brammer, Brooks & Pavelin, supra note 
53, at 4. 
 74. Greg Filbeck, Raymond Gormon & Dianna Preece, Fortune’s Most 
Admired Firms: An Investor’s Perspective, 18 STUDIES ECON. & FIN. 74, 79-80 
(1997). 
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firms.75  In another study, Konar and Cohen found that firms 
suffering the largest losses through stock effects generated by the 
TRI subsequently reduced their emissions more than other 
firms.76  However, a study of a Canadian equivalent to the TRI by 
Lanoie, Laplante and Roy found generally insignificant effects on 
firm value generated by capital market responses.77
In a study of the stock market response to environmental 
news in developing countries, Dasgupta, Laplante and Maningi 
find significant effects in response to both favorable news (e.g., 
awards) and negative events (e.g., citizen complaints and 
governmental enforcement actions).
  These 
studies are focused on the impact of information released in 
conjunction with regulatory programs, so their implications for 
the more “market-driven” type of information represented by 
third party corporate social responsibility rankings is unclear. 
78  This study provides some 
support for the claim that, at least in relation to environmental 
claims, information that is not generated through regulatory 
channels can have disciplinary effects through stock price 
incentives.  Gupta and Goldar provide evidence of the most direct 
relevance to the present study.79
 
 75. See generally James T. Hamilton, Pollution as News: Media and Stock 
Market Reactions to the Toxics Release Inventory Data, 28 J. ENVTL. ECON. & 
MGMT. 98 (1995). 
  The authors conducted an event 
study to determine the impact of environmental performance 
rankings of firms in India’s pulp and paper, auto and chlor-alkali 
manufacturing industries.  The rankings, composed by a UNEP-
assisted Indian NGO, compared each firm to an ideal “best 
practice,” ranked the firms and provided scores of one (worst) 
 76. See generally Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Information as 
Regulation: The Effect of Community Right to Know Laws on Toxic Emissions, 
32 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 109 (1997). 
 77. See Paul Lanoie, Benoit Laplante & Maite Roy, Can Capital Markets 
Create Incentives for Pollution Control?, 26 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 31, 38 (1998) (but 
also finding significant abnormal returns for cases where firms were repeatedly 
placed on the list of firms out of compliance or of concern). 
 78. See Susmita Dasgupta, Benoit Laplante & Nlandu Mamingi, Pollution 
and Capital Markets in Developing Countries, 42 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 310, 
312 (2001). 
 79. See Shreekant Gupta & Bishwanath Goldar, Do Stock Markets Penalize 
Environment-Unfriendly Behaviour? Evidence from India, 52 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 
81 (2005). 
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through five (best) “leaves.”80  While the authors’ results are 
somewhat mixed, they do find a statistically significant negative 
effect for pulp and paper firms, which all rated poorly relative to 
the ideal benchmark, and a stronger negative effect for the worst 
performers.81
Evidence on the potential for “market discipline” outside of 
the environmental side of corporate social responsibility is less 
well developed.  In one study, Epstein and Schnietz use an event 
study approach to examine the stock effects for industries 
identified as “abusive” during the 1999 Seattle World Trade 
Organization (WTO) protests.
  The study provides some evidence that third party 
rankings can provide information significant enough to markets 
to generate disciplinary incentive effects through stock price 
responses. 
82  The authors find that firms 
among the Fortune 500, in sectors characterized as having 
“abusive” environmental or labor practices, suffered significant 
negative excess returns in relation to the protests.83  However, 
disaggregating the categories led to only environmental concerns 
triggering significant responses.84  In another study, Rock uses 
an event study analysis to examine responses to news stories 
about the use of sweatshop labor by U.S. multinationals.85  He 
finds significant negative abnormal returns generated by the “bad 
news” sweatshop stories.86
 
 80. Id. at 82-85 (for description of the environmental performance rankings). 
  Both the studies above provide 
evidence that capital markets may create incentive effects that 
can provide an alternative to regulatory enforcement in relation 
to the corporate social responsibility commitments of 
transnational corporations.  However, the focus of the studies is 
quite narrow.  The present study will provide additional 
information about how capital markets react to a more systematic 
evaluation of corporate social responsibility performance, 
 81. Id. at 91. 
 82. See Marc J. Epstein & Karen E. Schnietz, Measuring the Cost of 
Environmental and Labor Protests to Globalization: An Event Study of the 
Failed 1999 Seattle WTO Talks, 16 INT’L TRADE J. 129, 129-30 (2002). 
 83. Id. at 152-53. 
 84. Id. at 153-55. 
 85. See generally Rock, supra note 34. 
 86. See id. at 29. 
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revealed through third party rankings, rather than news stories 
or specific protests. 
4 FORTUNE’S SUSTAINABILITY RANKINGS 
The entry of Fortune Magazine into the business of corporate 
social responsibility ranking is an illustration of how central it 
has become to the world’s largest companies.  Fortune is a leading 
popular business publication and is regarded as having the 
potential to influence investors through its business rankings.87
Fortune has produced annual rankings of corporate social 
responsibility performance since 2005.  The results of the 
rankings are published widely.  In addition to news releases and 
early availability of the results on the magazine’s website, the 
results are published in hard-copy editions of the magazine with 
additional articles and commentary.
 
88  The rankings are directed 
at assessing the performance of the world’s largest enterprises.  
The ranking methodology changed substantially in 2007, as it 
introduced a new component to measure the operational success 
of the ranked firms’ sustainability commitments.89  With this 
break in methodology, combined with the extreme turbulence in 
markets in recent years, I have restricted the current study to the 
initial releases of the rankings in 2005 and 2006.90
 
 87. See, e.g., Filbeck & Preece, supra note 70 at 790 (relative influence of 
Fortune and its rankings). 
 
 88. The 2005 rankings were published in the October 3, 2005 international 
edition of Fortune, see Simon Zadek, Responsibility Isn’t a Blame Game, 
FORTUNE INTERNATIONAL (ASIA), Oct. 3, 2005.  The 2006 rankings were published 
in the October 30, 2006 issue, see Simon Zadek, Separating Smart from Great, 
FORTUNE, Oct. 30, 2006.  Fortune has continued to publish its Sustainability 
Rankings each year, with results available in its November issue, as well as 
being available online. See, e.g., Most Accountable Companies for 2008, 
FORTUNE, Nov. 24, 2008, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/ 
global500/2008/accountability/index.html. 
 89. See ACCOUNTABILITY & CSRNETWORK, ACCOUNTABILITY RATING 2007 6 
(2007) available at http://www.accountabilityrating.com/past_results.asp. 
 90. I investigated whether it would be possible to extend the sample to 
include the later rankings, in order to see if the addition of the new component 
enhanced the market impact of the rankings.  However, by 2007 the events 
associated with the global financial crisis were beginning to have a significant 
impact on the sample firms, eliminating all but 25 firms when considering 
potential confounding news.  I felt that use of the event study methodology in 
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Even with this restricted sample, the selection criteria have 
changed somewhat.  The 2005 rankings were calculated for the 
full sample of firms within the Fortune Global 100.91  The 2006 
rankings were calculated for a sample that included the Global 
50, plus the ten largest companies in five sectors: automotive; 
computer, electronics and telecommunications; financials; 
petroleum refining; and utility/energy.  In addition, the 2006 
sample included the top ten firms from the 2005 rankings.92  The 
2006 results, which Fortune referred to as the G50+ results, 
extend to 64 companies.  The Fortune rankings build on and 
essentially continue corporate social responsibility rankings 
produced by the consultancies AccountAbility and csrnetwork.93  
The 2004 rankings produced by AccountAbility were initially 
published without the tie to Fortune.94
 
these unusual circumstances would be unlikely to reliably separate out the 
relatively small impact from the rankings. 
  The 2004 rankings 
targeted the Fortune Global 100, and they have been treated as 
methodologically comparable to Fortune’s rankings; they were 
 91. The “Global 100” are Fortune’s estimated largest 100 companies in the 
world measured by annual revenue. 
 92. See generally ACCOUNTABILITY & CSRNETWORK, ACCOUNTABILITY RATING 
2006: BENCHMARKING METHODOLOGY (2006), available at 
http://english.cbcsd.org.cn/dynamic/bringup/download/ar2006.pdf [hereinafter 
METHODOLOGY].  The inclusion of the top ten from 2005 is noted only in the 
summary of the results.  See ACCOUNTABILITY & CSRNETWORK, ACCOUNTABILITY 
RATING 2006: SUMMARY REPORT OF RESULTS 3 (2006), available at 
http://www.accountabilityrating.com/past_results.asp.  Since the 2005 top ten 
were strong performers, the requirement to include them in 2006 was largely 
redundant, which likely explains its absence from the documentation of 
methodology. 
 93. AccountAbility is a self-described “leading international organization” 
with a mission to “promote sustainable development” through the development 
of accountability tools and standards, including the AA1000 series in particular. 
See About Us, ACCOUNTABILITY, http://www.accountability.org/about-
us/index.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2010).  The OECD Expanded Review 
indicates that a small proportion of companies adhere to the AA1000 standard 
explicitly.  Csrnetwork is a “leading” U.K. corporate social responsibility 
consultancy firm. See About Us, CSRNETWORK, http://www.csrnetwork.com/ 
aboutus.asp (last visited Sept.11, 2010). 
 94. See ACCOUNTABILITY & CSRNETWORK, ACCOUNTABILITY RATING 2004 16 
(2004) available at http://www.accountabilityrating.com/past_results.asp. 
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published alongside the 2005 rankings in Fortune’s first annual 
corporate social responsibility review.95
The rankings for 2004-2006 are established by application of 
the corporate social responsibility assessment tool developed by 
AccountAbility, in conjunction with csrnetwork.  This standard 
incorporates aspects of the UN Global Compact, as well as the 
GRI, in constructing the standard.
 
96  In order to rate a company, 
evaluation is carried out across six “domains”: stakeholder 
engagement (individuals with ability to influence or be affected 
by business of the company); governance (consideration of 
stakeholder issues by senior executives, governance structures 
related to transparency and accountability); strategy (seek to 
achieve social and environmental targets alongside financial, 
embedded non-financial strategy); performance management 
(processes, standards and incentives target social and 
environmental goals); assurance (independent assurance of social 
and environmental management and reporting); and public 
disclosure (report thoroughly on social and environmental 
performance).97  For each of the domains, a score is established 
by considering the information available in each company’s 
published annual and sustainability reports.98  The stakeholder 
engagement and strategy domains are considered most 
important.99
 
 95. AccountAbility identifies the rankings for 2004-2006 as a comparable, 
consistent set of measures, although acknowledging some minor changes in the 
methodology. See METHODOLOGY, supra note 92, at 3 (comparability, use of 2004-
2006 rankings to identify trends over time), 5 (acknowledging changes in 
methodology).  For the purposes of the present study, it is the perceptions of the 
market to the rankings that is being assessed, so the presentation of the results 
as comparable to the published rankings is key. 
  A company can earn a maximum possible score of 
 96. See id. at 2.  It should be noted, however, that the precise way in which 
these initiatives are reflected in calculating the scores is not publicized. 
 97. See id. at 2-3. 
 98. The reports of the global operations were primary data for the Global 
rankings, although information on subsidiary companies that impact global 
operations were also considered.  Only reports published in English were 
assessed.  Only data contained in the published reports was considered, with the 
exception of data on company websites that was explicitly referenced in the 
published report. See METHODOLOGY, supra note 92, at 3. 
 99. The stakeholder engagement and strategy domains have maximum 
scores of 20 each, and the other domains have maximum scores of 15. See 
METHODOLOGY, supra note 92, at 2. 
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100.  The Fortune rankings publish the scores each company 
earns, as well as ranking the companies.100  Although the 
rankings are targeting corporate social responsibility, the 
approach stresses the business, rather than simply appealing to 
morals.  The rankings are intended to reflect corporate social 
responsibility as a profitable business strategy.101
The Fortune rankings provide a good case study to assess the 
potential for third party standards and rankings to support 
corporate social responsibility activity as a form of global public 
law.  The standard itself draws on instruments from the realm of 
international public law to weigh and rank the performance of 
large transnational corporations.  In addition, the application of 
this standard to information already in the public domain allows 
for a clean test of whether the standard and ranking per se is 
seen to convey new information by the market.  The focus on 
corporate social responsibility as a smart business strategy allows 
a test of whether markets agree with the case for profitability 
embedded in the standard.  The rankings present a cross-
sectional assessment of large companies that are focused on 
corporate social responsibility and which span a range of 
performance.  The annual rankings allow for assessment at a 
point in time, which can minimize confounding influences.  
However, the series of rankings introduces the dynamic element 
of relative performance over time.  This creates an additional 
opportunity to test whether markets may “punish” companies 
that slip in their performance, or reward “good” performers.  One 
potential limitation is that the rankings focus on the way in 
which corporate social responsibility is integrated into the 
 
 
 100. This is also the publication format for the 2004 rankings.  It is not 
completely clear how the ranks are established, as a number of companies had 
identical scores.  The GRI, which the Accountability methodology references, 
incorporates some qualitative criteria that may be reflected in the ultimate 
rankings.  Alternatively, identical composite scores that are more heavily 
weighted toward the critical stakeholder engagement and strategy categories 
may rank higher.  For the purposes of this study, I will assume that the ranks 
can be treated as reflecting additional information. 
 101. See Demos, supra note 34 at 1 (reporting on corporate social 
responsibility performance, expressing opinion that investment screened for 
corporate social responsibility reflects the view that “socially responsible 
companies will outperform companies that don’t engage a wide array of 
stakeholders… in an ongoing conversation about what can be done better.”). 
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business of the companies, rather than comparing the direct 
results of companies’ activity.102
5 EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGY 
  Like other standards, the 
Fortune rankings reflect a particular version of corporate social 
responsibility and it is the market response to this specification 
that will be revealed through empirical analysis. 
The announcement of unexpected information relevant to 
corporate performance provides the paradigmatic opportunity to 
use what is known as an “event study” analysis. Application of 
event study methodology is based on the assumption that stock 
markets rapidly process and absorb information (the efficient 
markets hypothesis), combined with the assumption that in 
equilibrium the value of a stock reflects the present discounted 
value of the investment.103  These twin assumptions allow the 
impact of an event that reveals new information about a company 
to be determined by looking to the response in the stock price 
immediately following the announcement of the event.  According 
to the efficient markets hypothesis, the financial implications for 
the company will be rapidly processed by investors and 
manifested in adjustments to the company’s stock price.104
 
 102. This aspect of the standard is illustrated by the fact that BP scores 
highly, as corporate social responsibility concerns are deeply embedded into 
their strategy and operations.  As a major oil company, their contribution to 
GHG, for example, would be enormous.  If practical effects of operations were 
the metric, BP would be unlikely to top the rankings.  The approach under the 
standard seems justifiable, since otherwise attention to corporate social 
responsibility would be practically impossible for many industries.  One cannot 
simply eliminate certain industries from promoting social responsibility, so it 
seems likely that a more nuanced approach will reflect the dimensions of 
corporate social responsibility that consumers and investors are likely to care 
about. 
  Event 
study analysis has been applied in a large number of published 
 103. For the seminal paper developing the event study methodology drawing 
on these assumptions, see Eugene F. Fama, Lawrence Fisher, Michael C. Jensen 
& Richard Roll, The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information, 10 INT’L 
ECON. REV. 1 (1969) (investigating the empirical impact of stock splits). See also 
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets II, 46 J. FIN. 1575 (1991) [hereinafter 
Efficient Capital Markets]. 
 104. See Efficient Capital Markets, supra note 103, at 1602. 
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papers.105  Event studies have been particularly useful tools 
within the realm of corporate law, given the close connection 
between the focus on securities prices in event studies and the 
shareholder primacy model of corporate law.106
The structure of an event study is quite straightforward.
 
107  
The first step is the identification of the unanticipated event of 
interest.  The announcement date must be identified; if the time 
at which the information becomes available cannot be pinned 
down fairly precisely, the event study methodology cannot be 
used.108  The usual practice is to specify an “event window” 
during which to assess the impact of the information on the stock 
price.  This is because both the exact time at which investors will 
have access to information is imprecise, and because markets 
may not react instantly and completely to information (semi-
strong efficient markets).  The window is usually specified as 
narrowly as possible, since the power of statistical results will 
diminish, conditional on sample size, as the window is 
expanded.109
 
 105. For a review of some papers dealing with the efficient markets 
hypothesis, see id. at 1599-1602.  For a general review, see A. Craig MacKinlay, 
Event Studies in Economics and Finance, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 13 (1997). 
 
 106. See generally Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the 
Law: Part I: Technique and Corporate Litigation, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 141 
(2002) [hereinafter Event Studies and the Law: Part I]; Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta 
Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part II: Empirical Studies of Corporate 
Law, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 380 (2002) (discussing the event study methodology 
and reviewing literature applying the method to assess the wealth effects of 
corporate litigation and the impact of corporate law more generally). 
 107. For descriptions of the event study methodology, see generally MacKinlay, 
supra note 105; Event Studies and the Law: Part I, supra note 106 (tailoring to a 
legal audience); John Binder, The Event Study Methodology Since 1969, 11 REV. 
OF QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 111 (1998); Stephen Brown & Jerold Warner, 
Using Daily Stock Returns: The Case of Event Studies, 14 J. OF FIN. ECON. 3 
(1985) [hereinafter Using Daily Stock Returns] (tailoring to a technical 
audience); Gupta & Goldar, supra note 79; Rock, supra note 34 (explaining 
applications of the methodology). 
 108. But note that event study methodology has been used to study the impact 
of regulatory changes, which can involve less precision in identifying the event 
time.  For a discussion of the application of the methodology under these 
conditions, see generally Douglas J. Lamdin, Implementing and Interpreting 
Event Studies of Regulatory Changes, 53 J. ECON. & BUS. 171 (2001). 
 109. For quantifications of the impact on power of the length of the event 
window for various sample sizes, see MacKinlay, supra note 105, at 29-34.  For a 
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The impact of the event for an individual firm is assessed by 
comparing the actual return on the firm’s security over the event 
window with the expected return.  More formally, one calculates 
the abnormal return for firm i in time period t: 
 
 
ARit = Rit − E(Rit | Xit )  
 
where Xit
 
Rit = α i + β iRmt + eit
 is the conditioning information used to determine 
the expected return on the firm’s security.  The most common 
approach to estimating the expected return is to employ the 
“market return” model.  The market return model assumes that 
the expected return on any given security is a stable linear 
function of the market return, which can be formally modeled as 
follows: 
 
 
where Rmt is the market return at time t and where eit
 
Var(eit ) = σ ei
2
 is a 
random disturbance with .110  As is common in many 
studies, I will use the market model to calculate expected 
returns.111
 
summary of the key results, see Event Studies and the Law: Part I, supra note 
106, at 88-92. 
 
 110. There are additional models for calculating the expected return, including 
the factor loading approach, a more complex version of the market model, which 
can offer marginal gains in precision at a cost of imposing additional data 
requirements. See MacKinlay, supra note 105, at 18-19.  Additional possibilities 
include models that impose restrictions from economic theory in the structure of 
the estimating equation for expected returns.  The main additional alternatives 
are the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the arbitrage pricing model.  
However, there is little to be gained relative to the market model by using these 
approaches, and the assumptions underlying the CAPM model have been called 
into question. Id. at 19. 
 111. Note that some authors have criticized the market model. See, e.g., J. 
Andrew Coutts, Terence C. Mills & Jennifer Roberts, The Market Model and The 
Event Study Method: A Synthesis of the Econometric Criticisms, 3 INT’L REV. OF 
FIN. ANALYSIS 149 (1994) (identifying ways in which the market model fails to 
conform to underlying assumptions, including non-normality and dependence in 
residuals, as well as instability in the estimated coefficient).  These problems 
render Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates inefficient and make it difficult 
to establish the power of statistical tests based on the estimates, which are 
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In order to calculate the abnormal return for firm i during 
period t, the market return model is estimated.  Ordinary Least 
Squares is both a consistent estimation procedure and efficient 
under the maintained assumptions above.112  Once the 
parameters of the market return model have been estimated, 
they can be used to predict the expected return for the security of 
company i at time t.  The difference between the predicted and 
actual return following the event will yield the “abnormal 
return,” ARit
 
 , that reveals the impact of the event on the value of 
the firm: 
 
ARit = Rit − ˆ α i − ˆ β iRmt  
 
The abnormal return is just the forecast error of the market 
model, calculated on an out of sample basis.  If the sample period 
for estimation of the market model itself is long enough, under 
the null excess returns will be normally distributed, with 
 
E(ARit ) = 0 and 
 
σ ARit
2 = σ ei
2
. 
In order to assess the significance of the event, abnormal 
returns are generally aggregated.  For individual firms, abnormal 
returns are aggregated over the period of the event window, T1 to 
T2
 
 to determine cumulative abnormal returns attributable to the 
event: 
 
CARi(T1,T2) = ARit
t=T1
T2
∑
 
 
The variance of cumulative abnormal returns for firm i over 
the event window is as follows: 
 
nevertheless valid asymptotically. But see John Cable & Kevin Holland, Robust 
vs. OLS Estimation of the Market Model: Implications for Event Studies, 69 
ECON. LETTERS 385, 388 (2000) (finding that normality of the errors is not 
generally a problem when returns are averaged over a portfolio of a size common 
in event studies (60 companies)). 
 112. See MacKinlay, supra note 105, at 20. 
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σ i
2(T1,T2) = (T2 − T1 +1)σ ei
2
 
 
The firm-specific hypothesis that cumulative abnormal 
returns are zero can be tested with a simple Z-statistic, 
distributed normally with the variance defined above.  However, 
results for a single firm are unlikely to be very meaningful, 
especially given the low power of tests for such a small sample. 
The general approach is to aggregate cumulative abnormal 
returns both over time (the event window) and across a number of 
firms that experience a similar event, or across a number of 
similar events for the same firm (e.g. across events).  Tests are 
then conducted using the cumulative average abnormal return: 
 
 
CAAR(T1,T2) =
1
N
CAR(T1,T2)
i=1
N
∑
 
 
The variance of CAAR will be given as follows: 
 
 
var(CAAR(T1,T2)) =
1
N2
σ i
2
i=1
N
∑ (T1,T2)
 
 
Under the null that the cumulative average abnormal 
returns are zero, a z-test can be used to test the statistical 
significance of the CAAR for the event window, averaged across 
firms/events.113
 
 113. The distributional results are asymptotic, so a large enough sample of 
events and estimation period for the market return model are required to avoid 
inaccuracy from imposing the asymptotic distribution. See MacKinlay, supra 
note 105, at 24.  A further problem with statistical inference for cumulative 
average abnormal returns measures can arise from failure of the assumptions of 
independent, identical distributions for the abnormal returns of the firms in the 
sample.  “Clustering” of the events in calendar time and of sample firms within 
industry groups can lead to violation of these assumptions by creating cross-
sectional dependence. See Stephen J. Brown & Jerold B. Warner, Measuring 
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6 ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
6.1 Estimation Data 
A number of refinements to the sample of ranked firms 
included in Fortune’s analysis were required in order to carry out 
the estimation.  I obtained daily common stock prices from the 
CRSP database for the firms included in the 2004, 2005 and 2006 
corporate social responsibility rankings associated with Fortune 
magazine and AccountAbility.114  Only firms trading on the 
NYSE or NASDAQ could be included in the sample.  This 
required dropping some firms since a number of the firms 
included in the Fortune rankings are traded on other exchanges, 
or are not public companies.115  In order to have a sufficiently 
long period to estimate the market returns model, a period of 200 
calendar days prior to the event date was chosen.116
 
Security Price Performance, 8 J. FIN. ECON. 205, 233 (1980); Using Daily Stock 
Returns, supra note 107, at 28; Binder, supra note 107, at 120; MacKinlay, 
supra note 105, at 28.  However, so long as securities are chosen from a 
sufficient number of different industries and the market model is used, 
assuming independence is unlikely to be problematic. See Binder, supra note 
107, at 116; Using Daily Stock Returns, supra note 107, at 15, 22. 
  This 
 114. CRSP is the Center for Research on Securities Prices database, 
associated with the Booth Business School at the University of Chicago.  For a 
history of this database, see About CRSP, History, CHI. BOOTH, CTR. FOR 
RESEARCH IN SEC. PRICES, http://www.crsp.com/crsp/about/history.html (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2010).  The data can be accessed through allied third party data 
services, for a list, see The CRSP Third Party Alliance Program, CHI. BOOTH, 
CTR. FOR RESEARCH IN SEC. PRICES, http://www.crsp.com/crsp/alliances.html (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2010).  The stock prices that I use from the CRSP database were 
adjusted for dividends. 
 115. For example, some state-owned energy companies, such as the Mexican 
Pemex, were included in the Fortune rankings.  Although the Fortune rankings 
do not disclose whether the companies are publicly held, privately held, or state 
owned, this information is generally readily available through company sites or 
media sources.  The CRSP database naturally does not include data on 
securities prices for companies that are not publicly traded. 
 116. This resulted in estimation periods for the market model of 138, 139 and 
135 trading days for 2006, 2005 and 2004, respectively.  Choosing a sufficiently 
long period for estimation of the market model, in comparison with the event 
window, reduces bias in hypothesis tests about cumulative average abnormal 
returns that can arise from time dependence in the residuals from the market 
model and cumulative abnormal returns of firms. See Binder, supra note 107, at 
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eliminated a number of additional firms, as prices for the common 
stock were not available on a continuous basis throughout the 
pre-event period.117  Finally, some firms were excluded because of 
possible confounding news within the event windows for 
assessing the impact of the Fortune rankings.118  The final 
sample included 52 firms in 2004, 52 firms in 2005 and 37 firms 
in 2006.119
 
  The firms, although transnational in their operations, 
were headquartered in three major regions: Asia, North America 
and Europe.  The firms represented a diverse array of sectors, 
including automotive manufacturing; computers and electronics; 
petroleum refining and chemicals; energy and utilities; financial, 
trading and merchandise; and consumer products.  Summary 
data for the sample firms is given in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
116 (citing Michael Salinger, Standard Errors in Event Studies, 27 J. OF FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 39 (1992). 
 117. Merger was generally the culprit. 
 118. If other events that might be expected to influence a company’s stock 
price occur at the same time as Fortune’s rankings are released, the impact of 
those events will overlap with any effect of the rankings, so that it is not 
possible to identify the influence of the rankings.  I chose to search media 
databases for any stories related to the included companies, eliminating from 
the sample any firms with possible confounding news.  I searched the Financial 
Times database in Westlaw, which includes articles from the Financial Times 
U.K. and U.S. editions, as well as online articles from the Financial Times 
website.  I also performed secondary searches in the The NEWSINT-PRO 
database containing full text documents from WestnewsPRO International 
News.  I excluded companies if articles mentioning the company in the headlines 
or lead paragraphs, appeared to reveal or be based on new information.  The 
confounding events included strike settlement, announcements related to the 
initiation and settlement of lawsuits, bond downgrades and earnings 
announcements. 
 119. The timing of the 2006 Fortune Rankings was unfortunate from the 
perspective of using an event study analysis, since a number of companies, 
including BP, Shell, GM and others, reported their third quarter earnings 
during this period. 
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Table 1: Summary Data: Sample CSR Ranked Firms 
Year 2004 2005 2006 
 
Number of Firms 
North America 
Europe 
Asia 
 
CSR Scores 
Average CSR Score 
Average CSR Leader’s Score 
Average CSR Laggard’s 
Minimum Score 
Maximum Score 
 
52 
25 
21 
6 
 
 
23 
39 
6 
1 
67 
 
 
52 
27 
20 
5 
 
 
31 
48 
11 
2 
71 
 
37 
15 
15 
7 
 
 
33 
52 
14 
4 
72 
Note: Corporate social responsibility “Leaders” and  “Laggards” are 
respectively defined as firms within the top third and bottom third 
of the sample ranked firms. 
 
In order to implement the analysis, the event date must be 
identified and event windows must be specified.  The Fortune 
rankings are announced through press releases and uploaded to 
the Internet prior to hard-copy publication in the magazine.  I 
have assumed that the appropriate event date is the initial 
release of the information through the media and electronic 
distribution of the results.  These dates were obtained from press 
releases and web-based material on the rankings.  The 2004 
AcountAbility rankings were announced in a press release and 
timed for release to coincide with the UN Global Compact 
Leaders Summit in New York.120
 
 120. See Press Release, AccountAbility, New Global Rating Challenges Top 
100 Companies’ Accountability (June 23, 2004), available at 
http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/14269-New-Global-Rating-Challenges-
Top-100-Companies-Accountability. 
  For both the Fortune and 
AccountAbility rankings, information should have been widely 
available to the public on the release date. The initial publication 
of information about the ranking and scores of the companies 
thus provides a relatively crisp indication of the appropriate 
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event dates.121  Nevertheless, it is possible that some information 
was available early,122 and there is uncertainty about the precise 
time that the information was available on the event date.123
The theory does not offer a strong methodological basis for 
the selection of the event window, beyond general concerns with 
loss of power and an increased possibility of confounding events 
as the window is lengthened.  The speed at which markets are 
presumed to adjust is critical to the appropriate length of the 
event window.  While some scholars recommend windows limited 
to one, or perhaps two days,
 
124 others have applied event 
windows well over a week in length.125  Recent research by 
Antweiler and Frank indicates that very short event windows 
may not be appropriate, and that results can be very sensitive to 
the choice of event window.126  In this study, I have considered 
event windows of various lengths as a robustness check on the 
findings.  Letting day 0 be the event day and denoting days prior 
to the event with a - sign, the event windows I consider are: [0], 
[0,2], [0,4], [-1,0], [-1,1], [-1,3].  Roughly, these correspond to 
considering one, three and five day alternatives for the event 
window, beginning on the event day itself and one day prior to 
the event date.127
A final point to note is that estimation requires the selection 
of a measure of market returns.  There are several possible 
choices; the analysis reported here is based on use of the value-
 
 
 121. The relevant dates are June 23, 2004; September 22, 2005; and October 
23, 2006. 
 122. For example, in a copy of the 2004 rankings press release on file with the 
author, the release indicates that it is embargoed until June 23, 2004.  This 
suggests that some members of the media may have had prior access to the 
data, and that some of the information may have leaked out ahead of the official 
stories. See Press Release, AccountAbility, New Global Rating Challenges Top 
100 Companies’ Accountability (June 23, 2004) (on file with author). 
 123. If the information was not available early enough in the day, it may not 
have been possible for investors to respond through trading on the event day. 
 124. See Using Daily Stock Returns, supra note 107, at 15. 
 125. See, e.g., Gupta & Goldar, supra note 79, at 88 (using a ten-day window 
as their preferred choice). 
 126. Werner Antweiler & Murray Z. Frank, Do U.S.  Stock Markets Typically 
Overreact to Corporate News Stories 3 (Aug. 2006) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with authors). 
 127. The “one” day window for the [-1,0] window is, of course, two days.  I will 
generally refer to these windows collectively as the “immediate” event windows. 
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weighted NYSE/NASDAQ composite return available in the 
CRSP database.  However, estimation using the alternatives of 
the equal-weighted composite and the Standard & Poor 500 
returns produced generally similar results.128
6.2 Results 
 
The first empirical questions of interest are whether the 
Fortune corporate social responsibility rankings were seen by the 
market as providing significant independent information, and 
whether markets viewed the corporate social responsibility 
investments of firms favorably.  In order to address these issues, I 
first look to the cumulative abnormal returns, averaged over the 
full sample of ranked firms.  The results from estimation of the 
CAAR for each year/event window combination are presented in 
Table 2. 
The results from Table 2 provide only weak support for 
claims that Fortune’s third party corporate social responsibility 
rankings are perceived by the market as conveying new 
information relevant to the value of firms.  The strongest support 
for the independent significance of the Fortune/AccountAbility 
rankings is found in the immediate and the five-day windows for 
2004.  The immediate reaction to the release of the rankings is a 
weakly significant negative response.  If the day prior to the 
release date is included, the rankings can be associated with a 
statistically significant drop of 0.47% on average in the share 
prices of the sample firms.129
 
  However, there is no significant 
immediate response if we focus only on measuring the impact 
from the actual release date of the rankings. 
 
 
 
 
 128. I discuss the results with the alternate measures when the results vary.  
The market returns were adjusted for dividends to correspond to the adjusted 
share prices used for the event study firms. 
 129. This is supported by the similar result obtained using the S&P 500 as an 
alternate market measure: [-1,0] window CAAR = -0.0047* (Z-stat = 1.64).  Note 
that the alternative of the equal weighted NYSE did not produce significant 
results. 
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Table 2: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for 
CSR Rankings 
Year [0] [0,2] [0,4] 
2006 
 
 
2005 
 
 
2004 
 
-0.0026 
(-1.41) 
 
-0.0022 
(-1.41) 
 
-0.0008 
(-0.46) 
-0.0029 
(-0.90) 
 
-0.0013 
(-0.48) 
 
0.0040 
(1.23) 
0.0007 
(0.17) 
 
0.0012 
(0.33) 
 
0.0088** 
(2.14) 
 
Year [-1,0] [-1,1] [-1,3] 
2006 
 
 
2005 
 
 
2004 
 
 
0.0020 
(0.77) 
 
0.0034 
(1.55) 
 
-0.0047* 
(-1.81) 
0.0022 
(0.67) 
 
-0.0006 
(-0.22) 
 
0.0003 
(0.11) 
0.0022 
(0.53) 
 
0.0019 
(0.56) 
 
0.0057 
(1.39) 
Note: The Z-statistics for the null of no significant CAAR for each 
year-event window are included in parenthesis. Significant Z-
statistics are identified as follows: ∗ = significant at 10%; ∗∗ = 
significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ = significant at 1% or higher level of 
significance for a two tailed test. 
 
The significant positive five-day CAAR for 2004 provides 
some evidence that the market perceived the rankings as “good” 
news, enhancing the profitability of the ranked firms.  Additional 
support for this interpretation can be found in the consistent 
results obtained using the S&P 500 as the alternate market 
measure.  These alternate estimates produce significant positive 
CAAR in 2004 in the five-day window whether beginning on the 
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event day or one day prior, as well as in the three-day window 
from the event date.130  The use of the longer window might be 
justified if stock returns tend to initially “over-react” to news and 
drift toward equilibrium over a longer period than the typical 
event window of one or two days.131  The magnitude of the 
significant effects associated with the rankings in 2004 is not 
large, but does compare favorably with estimates from some other 
studies of information as regulation.  For example, Hamilton 
identified statistically significant negative effects from the first 
release of the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) data in the order of 
0.28% to 0.37%.132
Set against this optimistic interpretation of the results, one 
must consider the more general pattern of inconsistent and 
insignificant results for the other years.  There are no significant 
abnormal returns generated by the release of the rankings in 
2006, although this general conclusion is not always robust across 
alternate market measures.
 
133
 
 130. The 2004 significant estimates for the S&P alternate market measure are 
as follows: [0,2] window CAAR = 0.0091***(Z-stat=2.82); [0,4] window CAAR = 
0.0126***(Z-stat=3.02); [-1,3] window CAAR = 0.0095**(Z-stat=2.28).  Note that 
the alternative of the equal weighted NYSE did not produce significant results. 
  In addition, the signs of the 
estimated abnormal returns in 2006 are not consistent across the 
alternative specifications of the event window.  The shorter 
 131. See Antweiler & Frank, supra note 126, at 3. 
 132. Hamilton, supra note 75, at 108-109.  These figures are for Hamilton’s 
estimates of cumulative average abnormal returns for a one-day window.  He 
found larger, significant negative effects over a five-day window, ranging from -
0.93% to -1.2%. See id. at 108. See also Madhu Khanna, Wilma Rose H. Quimio 
& Dora Bojilova, Toxics Release Information: A Policy Tool for Environmental 
Protection, 36 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 243, 252 (1998) (finding statistically 
significant effects ranging from -0.31% to -0.71% over a two-day window and 
from -0.56% to -0.57% over a five-day window for chemical industry firms 
covered by the TRI over the period from 1990 to 1994). See also Konar & Cohen, 
supra note 76 at 115-116 (finding that firms mentioned in the media in relation 
to the first release of the TRI data experienced significant negative returns of -
0.29% (one-day) to -0.74% (five-day)). 
 133. A significant negative CAAR is generated for 2006 for the [0] window 
using the S&P 500 market measure (CAAR = -0.0038**(Z-stat=2.02)).  Looking 
to the event windows beginning one day prior to the release of the rankings, the 
significant results produce positive abnormal returns when the equal weighted 
NYSE index is used as the market measure: [-1,0] window CAAR = 0.0084***(Z-
stat = 3.14); [-1,1] window CAAR = 0.0090***(Z-stat = 2.73); [-1,3] window CAAR 
= 0.0089**(Z-stat = 2.09). 
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windows beginning from the release date of the rankings indicate 
a negative market response.  In contrast, those beginning one-day 
prior yield positive abnormal return estimates.  A similar pattern 
is evident in the 2005 results.  The signs on the CAAR for the 
immediate windows are inconsistent and the estimates 
insignificant.134  While the signs on the estimates are consistent 
for the other event windows, the results are not significant and 
the absolute size of the CAAR is very small, with a maximum 
impact of 0.19% over a five-day window.135
A number of factors may contribute to the lack of significant 
reaction in the markets.  The 2006 sample is relatively small, at 
only 37 firms.  This may have contributed to a loss of power and 
made it difficult to reliably detect the small impact of the 
rankings on the stock return estimates.
  Given the general 
insignificance of the results and lack of robustness across event 
windows and market measures, the results provide little support 
for the idea that the market regarded the rankings as important 
information relevant to the value of the firms in the sample. 
136  There is a fairly high 
proportion of European firms in the sample.  More stringent 
European regulatory requirements for reporting corporate social 
responsibility activity may have helped diminish the impact of 
the information conveyed by the relative rankings of the firms in 
the Fortune rankings.137
 
 134. The insignificance of the results is not always consistent for the 
immediate windows.  For the [0] window, a significant negative CAAR is 
generated for 2005 when using the S&P 500 as the market measure (CAAR =     
-0.0039** (Z-stat = 2.54)), whereas for the [-1,0] window a significant positive 
CAAR is generated when using the equal weighted NYSE measure (CAAR =       
-0.0073*** (Z-stat = 3.27)).  In both these cases, the other two alternate market 
measures do not generate significant results. 
  A more general possibility is that there 
 135. A slightly larger maximum impact is obtained when using the equal 
weighted return as the market measure (0.4% maximum effect over five days), 
but the estimate remains statistically indistinguishable from the alternative of 
no impact attributable to the rankings.  The magnitude of the estimated CAAR 
using the alternative of the S&P 500 essentially mirrors the value weighted 
market measure estimates of Table 2. 
 136. Recall that in 2006 there are only 37 firms in the sample, compared with 
52 for 2005 and 52 firms in 2004. See supra Table 1. 
 137. For a concise summary of relevant corporate law related to corporate 
social responsibility reporting, see KPMG 2005, supra note 2, at 31.  The relative 
share of European firms is 41% in 2006 compared with 38% in 2005 and 40% in 
2004. See supra Table 1. 
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is not enough change in the rankings from one year to another for 
subsequent annual releases to provide significant new 
information to markets.  This explanation is consistent with 
finding the strongest results associated with 2004 (the initial 
release of the rankings by AccountAbility).  While corporate social 
responsibility performance may be important to firms and 
investors on an ongoing basis, the event study methodology may 
fail to disclose this effect in relation to annual corporate social 
responsibility rankings. 
Another possibility is that the results for the CAARs of all 
ranked firms do not really provide a satisfactory way of 
addressing the question of whether corporate social responsibility 
investment is viewed as enhancing firm value.  The range of 
performances across firms in Fortune’s rankings may prevent a 
clear analysis by averaging CAARs over all the firms.  If markets 
perceive corporate social responsibility as enhancing firm value, 
one might expect that higher-ranking firms would be rewarded 
with positive CAARs, while laggards would be punished with 
smaller CAARs or even negative CAARs.  In order to investigate 
this hypothesis and tease out the implications of the Fortune 
rankings for the role of market discipline in enforcing corporate 
social responsibility commitments, I conducted a split-sample 
estimation for “leaders” and “laggards.”  As one reduces the size 
of the sample, the power of estimates is reduced.  Consequently, 
there is an uncertain balance to be struck between identifying 
these sub-groups narrowly and still including enough firms for 
robust estimation.  As an admittedly somewhat arbitrary 
compromise, I have classified the top third of sample firms as 
“leaders” and the bottom third of firms as ‘‘laggards.”  Results for 
the various event windows and years are shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for 
CSR Leaders and Laggards 
Year Relative Rank [0] [0,2] [0,4] 
2006 
 
 
 
 
 
2005 
 
 
 
 
 
2004 
Top Third 
 
 
Bottom Third 
 
 
Top Third 
 
 
Bottom Third 
 
 
Top Third 
 
 
Bottom Third 
-0.0005 
(-0.15) 
 
-0.0019 
(-0.56) 
 
-0.0034 
(-1.41) 
 
-0.0007 
(-0.23) 
 
-0.0044 
(-1.47) 
 
0.0006 
(0.17) 
-0.0012 
(-0.21) 
 
0.0036 
(0.60) 
 
-0.0022 
(-0.49) 
 
0.0021 
(0.40) 
 
-0.0034 
(-0.65) 
 
0.0029 
(0.50) 
-0.0020 
(-0.27) 
 
0.0091 
(1.19) 
 
0.0017 
(0.28) 
 
0.0044 
(0.66) 
 
-0.0024 
(-0.36) 
 
0.0003 
(0.05) 
Year Relative Rank [-1,0] [-1,1] [-1,3] 
2006 
 
 
 
 
 
2005 
 
 
 
 
Top Third 
 
 
Bottom Third 
 
 
Top Third 
 
 
Bottom Third 
0.0088* 
(1.90) 
 
0.0003 
(0.06)  
 
0.0034 
(0.90) 
 
.0026 
(0.86) 
0.0062 
(1.1) 
 
0.0037 
(0.62)  
 
-0.0008 
(-0.17) 
 
.0027 
(0.52) 
0.0070 
(0.96) 
 
0.0079 
(1.03)  
 
0.0020 
(0.34) 
 
.0038 
(0.56) 
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Year Relative Rank [-1,0] [-1,1] [-1,3] 
2004 Top Third 
 
 
Bottom Third 
-0.0102** 
(-2.39) 
 
-0.0022 
(-0.46) 
-0.0080 
(-1.52) 
 
0.0019 
(0.32) 
-0.0048 
(-0.71) 
 
-0.0016 
(-0.21) 
Note: The Z-statistics for the null of no significant CAAR for each 
year-event window are included in parenthesis.  Significant Z-
statistics are identified as follows: ∗ = significant at 10%; ∗∗ 
=significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ =significant at 1% or higher level of 
significance for a two-tailed test. 
 
The results do not provide strong empirical support for the 
idea that sustainability rankings can operate as a form of market 
regulation that might encourage firms to undertake corporate 
social responsibility commitments and help enforce them.  Again, 
the predominant pattern is the absence of statistically significant 
results for either leaders or laggards in response to their 
rankings.  There are some exceptions.  For example, in 2006, 
there is a positive significant response to the ranking of the 
“leader” firms, if the immediate window includes the day prior to 
release of the rankings, but not otherwise.138
 
 138. A similar result is obtained when using the equal weighted NYSE as the 
alternate market measure: [-1,0] window Top 1/3 CAAR = 0.0144*** (Z-stat = 
3.09). 
  The absolute size of 
this effect is fairly large, reflecting an unanticipated increase in 
average share value of 0.88%.  The level of corporate social 
responsibility performance in 2006 was higher than in any 
previous year for the leaders, so such a response would tend to 
reinforce incentives for companies to invest in the corporate social 
responsibility commitments reflected in the rankings.  Some 
additional support for this theory might be garnered by looking to 
results for 2005, using the equal weighted NYSE as the market 
measure.  In 2005, using this alternate market measure, and 
looking at the event window including a day prior to the rankings 
announcement, corporate social responsibility “leaders” 
experience statistically and economically significant positive 
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abnormal returns.  The increase in share value peaks at 1.28% for 
the five-day window.139
However, looking at the results more broadly, the evidentiary 
support for such an interpretation is fragile.  If we focus on the 
abnormal returns for 2006, beginning from the ranking release 
date, the sign of the estimated response is negative for leader 
firms and the results are insignificant.  Similarly, in 2005, if we 
look at responses from the release date, the sign of returns is 
again negative and any deviations in returns cannot confidently 
be attributed to the impact of the rankings.
 
140  In addition, the 
sign on the estimated abnormal returns for the “laggards” is often 
positive and similar in magnitude to effects estimated for the 
“leaders”, although the “laggard’s” results are also not generally 
significant for 2005 or 2006.141
Results for 2004 also fail to provide strong evidence 
supporting either the viability of corporate social responsibility 
investments, or a quasi-regulatory impact for the Fortune 
rankings.  The results for leaders in 2004 achieve the highest 
degree of statistical significance and are relatively large.  The 
initial reaction, including one day prior to the rankings, was a 
drop of 1.02% in the average share value of leader firms.  The 
existence of a negative response for leader firms in 2004, and its 
statistical significance is one of the few relatively robust 
results.
 
142
 
 139. The results for leaders in 2005 for these windows using the equal 
weighted NYSE market measure are as follows: [-1,0] CAAR = 0.0072* (Z-stat = 
1.91); [-1,1] CAAR = 0.0122** (Z-stat = 2.14); [-1,3] CAAR = 0.0128* (Z-stat = 
1.73). 
  To the extent that the market responded, it indicated 
 140. One significant result is generated when the S&P 500 is used as the 
market measure.  This market measure generates a significant abnormal return 
from the rankings on their release date, but the sign is negative, not positive: [0] 
window CAAR for S&P = -0.0048* (Z-stat = 1.80). 
 141. There is a significant positive return for the “laggard” firms generated 
when the equal weighted NYSE measure is used for the market return, and the 
window includes a day prior to rankings release: [-1,4] window CAAR = .0134* 
(Z-stat = 1.74).  This significant positive return exceeds the comparable estimate 
for the corporate social responsibility  “leaders”. 
 142. A significant negative response is generated when using the equal 
weighted NYSE market return for: the [0,2] window (CAAR = -0.0115**(Z-
stat=2.15)); the [-1,0] window (CAAR = -0.0071*(Z-stat= 1.63);      [-1,4] window 
(CAAR = -0.0114*(Z-stat = 1.65).  A significant negative response is generated 
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that the relatively larger investments of leaders in corporate 
social responsibility did not enhance their market value.  A 
potential explanation for the 2004 results may rest with the fact 
that the average score of the leaders was lower in 2004 than in 
subsequent years.143
The difficulty with this story is revealed by the performance 
of laggards.  While corporate social responsibility laggards did 
experience some negative CAARs in relation to the release of the 
2004 rankings, these results were not large, not consistent, and 
statistically insignificant.  This is in sharp contrast to the 
consistently negative, larger, and often significant losses the 
corporate social responsibility rankings in 2004 produced for the 
leaders. 
  Perhaps even the top third of firms in 2004 
were viewed by the market as coming up short in their corporate 
social responsibility commitments. 
At the very least, the indifference of the market to the very 
negative rankings of the laggards suggests that there is no 
uniform market incentive for firms to engage in the type of public 
law-oriented corporate social responsibility reflected in the 
Fortune rankings.  The risks and rewards are specific to the firms 
and industries involved.  Walmart, as a laggard in the 2004-2006 
sample, may not be “disciplined” by the market if improvements 
in its ranking would require it to abandon its business model 
based on highly competitive labor conditions, and instead involve 
labor as a stakeholder and promote collective bargaining.144
 
when using the S&P 500 measure for the [-1,0] window (CAAR = -0.0099** (Z-
stat = 2.28)). 
  
 143. Recall that the average leader’s score in 2004 was only 39 out of a 
possible 100 points, compared with average leader scores of 48 and 52 in 2005 
and 2006, respectively.  See supra Table 1. 
 144. In fact, Walmart has moved from its “laggard” position at the bottom of 
the ranking in more recent surveys.  It now ranks 64th in 2008 with a score of 
44 on the AccountAbility scale, in contrast with its initial 2004 ranking at 86th 
with a score of 6. See Full G100 Ranking, Accountability Rating 2008, 
ACCOUNTABILITY, http://www.accountabilityrating.com/ latest_overview.asp (last 
visited Sept. 16, 2010).  The company has invested particularly in 
environmental sustainability initiatives over this period, and has announced its 
own sustainability index initiative. See also Press Release, Walmart, Walmart 
Announces Sustainable Product Index (July 16, 2009), available at 
http://walmartstores.com/pressroom/news/9277.aspx.  The Walmart example 
illustrates that corporate social responsibility can influence the business 
decisions of large firms, even if third party rankings are not effective 
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Alternatively, perennial corporate social responsibility leaders, 
such as BP, may be viewed as engaging in necessary strategic 
positioning; poor CSR commitments by these firms may leave 
economically important opportunities to influence their business 
environment unrealized.145
While the evidence supporting a “regulatory” role for 
corporate social responsibility rankings appears weak, this may 
partly be a function of the empirical methodology.  It may be that 
the focus on the top third and bottom third of firms does not 
match the way that the market views the corporate social 
responsibility performance of the firms.  The approach may be too 
arbitrary; simply using aggregate CAARs across 
“leader”/’’laggard” groupings might be insufficient to precisely 
identify the independent impact of the relative rankings.  In 
addition, the simple aggregate CAARs do not allow us to control 
for some factors that may be relevant to the impact of the 
rankings.  For example, many of the top performers are European 
firms.  Assessing the market response to the rankings may 
require controlling for the home jurisdiction of the companies, 
both because there may be a “home bias” in investor responses 
and because European corporate law imposes more stringent 
reporting requirements for corporate social responsibility 
  The lack of a consistent positive 
market response to corporate social responsibility investments 
undermines claims that broad-based corporate social 
responsibility rankings such as Fortune’s can operate as an 
enforcement mechanism tending to promote the widespread 
adoption of corporate social responsibility policies implementing 
public law norms.  Assessing the split sample results as a whole, 
there is little evidence that the market responds favorably to the 
more intensive corporate social responsibility investments of 
Fortune’s leaders and the poor performance of laggards appears 
to go unpunished. 
 
disciplinary devices.  The type of corporate social responsibility engaged in 
would then be what the company deems in its long run interests.  By 
constructing its own index, Walmart obtains some room to tailor the vision of 
sustainability to reflect its own business interests and strengths, rather than 
having to adjust in response to externally imposed norms. 
 145. This would be one way to interpret the significant negative response in 
2004 for the leader firms; investors and consumers may have felt that the level 
of commitment was too weak, despite the firms being relative leaders. 
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activity.146  These stricter requirements may mean that the 
Fortune rankings, which draw on published data, provide less in 
the way of comparative information about the quality of 
European firms’ corporate social responsibility activity.  Another 
possibility is that there are sector-specific influences that are 
important to understanding the results for the cut sample.  The 
small size of the leader/laggard samples also means that single 
firms may dominate the analysis more easily.  While a number of 
other event studies have used stratification of the sample as a 
way to unpack the market response to the quality of performance, 
an alternative approach will provide a further check on the 
robustness of conclusions from the analysis above.147
In order to obtain a finer assessment of the market response 
to relative performance of the ranked firms, as well as the market 
response to a firm’s own changes in its corporate social 
responsibility rank, I ran a pooled cross-sectional analysis of the 
individual CARs for each firm over the 2005 and 2006 years 
covering the Fortune rankings.
 
148
 
  The estimating equation takes 
the following general form: 
 
ARit = α + βXit + eit  
 
where 
 
α  is a constant and Xit
 
 146. See KPMG 2005, supra note 2, at 40. 
 is a vector of firm-specific 
characteristics at time t.  In the specifications, I included a time 
trend, as well as dummies for the industrial classification of the 
firm, the home jurisdiction of the firm, the percentile corporate 
social responsibility rank of the firm and the change in the firm’s 
percentile rank from the previous ranking.  I estimated the cross-
 147. See, e.g., Gupta & Goldar, supra note 79 at 88-92 (constructing CAARs for 
subsamples of their firms based on the number of “leaves” received in the 
environmental ranking). 
 148. The time dimension was restricted this way in order to use the 2004 
rankings to provide data on the dynamic performance of the firms.  Note that 
because the sample of firms changed somewhat with each ranking, some firms 
did not have rankings in 2004 or 2005 to provide the basis for measuring the 
change in rank.  These firms were dropped from the pooled estimation.  The 
pooled sample consisted of results for 78 firms.  The choice to restrict the sample 
period to 2005-2006 also restricts the estimation to direct rankings published 
through Fortune. 
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sectional regression over the CARs generated from the set of 
event windows previously considered. The results for the 
coefficient estimates on rank and change in rank are reported in 
Table 4.149
 
 
Table 4: Cross Sectional Results: CSR Rank and 
Changes in Relative Rank 
Variable [0] [0,2] [0,4] 
Rank 
 
 
Delta Rank 
 
0.0076* 
(0.084) 
 
0.0036 
(0.535) 
 
-0.0036 
(0.706) 
 
0.0142 
(0.271) 
 
-0.0094 
(0.394) 
 
0.0077 
(0.601) 
 
Variable [-1,0] [-1,1] [-1,3] 
Rank 
 
 
Delta Rank 
  
0.0150** 
(0.041) 
 
-0.0067 
(0.486) 
0.0095 
(0.203) 
 
-0.0066 
(0.696) 
0.0016 
(0.888) 
 
-0.0044 
(0.774) 
Note: The p-values for the coefficient estimates are given in 
brackets.  Significant coefficient estimates are identified as 
follows: ∗ =significant at 10%; ∗∗ =significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ 
=significant at 1% or higher level of significance for a one tailed 
test. 
 
The results from the pooled cross-sectional analysis offer 
some additional support for claims that corporate social 
 
 149. I have used rank as the appropriate measure in this analysis, on the 
assumption that this is a more precise measure of the firms’ corporate social 
responsibility  performance than the individual corporate social responsibility  
scores.  However, estimation using the corporate social responsibility  scores did 
not generate substantially different results, although significance of the 
estimates was reduced.  Regressions with additional dummies to identify 
“outliers” with extremely positive or negative relative changes in their rankings 
also were not generally significant.  The results in Table 4 are based on using 
the CAR for each firm generated with the value weighted NYSE market return.  
The results for the alternative market measures are generally similar.  Again, I 
discuss these alternative results when they vary. 
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responsibility is profitable and that market responses generated 
by third party rankings may provide incentives for firms to 
adhere to their commitments.  The coefficient on percentile rank 
is positive and significant for the immediate event windows.150
Even this optimism must be tempered, however, since the 
results for the change in relative rank appear to indicate that 
there is little dynamic disciplinary effect.  The coefficient 
estimates are positive, but insignificant, for the three-day and 
five-day windows beginning on the event day itself.  In contrast, 
insignificant, negative coefficients for changes in own-rank are 
observed for the pre-announcement event windows.
  
These results support a fairly immediate positive relationship 
between corporate social responsibility performance and 
abnormal returns.  This positive relationship indicates that once 
we look to the finer cross-sectional data, adding basic controls, 
markets view more significant investments in corporate social 
responsibility as enhancing the value of the company, while below 
average performance is associated with lower returns.  The cross-
section results thus offer some assurance that corporate social 
responsibility rankings such as those produced by Fortune can 
produce market effects that will provide incentives to reward 
good performers and discipline poorly ranked companies.  The 
results support a limited optimism that third party rankings such 
as Fortune’s can operate as one means of promoting effective 
corporate social responsibility commitments and reinforcing the 
embedded norms in a transnational setting. 
151
 
 150. The coefficients on the rank coefficient are similar in magnitude and 
significance when the alternative market measures of the equal weighted NYSE 
and S&P 500 are used.  The coefficient for the [0] window is marginally 
insignificant when the equal weighted return is used (p<0.139).  All other 
estimates for the immediate window remain significant, at a slightly lower level 
than the coefficients in Table 4 for the equal weighted market return and a 
slightly higher level for the S&P 500 alternate market measure.  The 
coefficients on the change in rank variable in the immediate windows are 
similarly signed and insignificant for the alternative market measures.  The 
estimates on rank and change in rank for all other windows also remain 
insignificant across the alternate market measures. 
  These 
 151. Alternative specifications using dummies for firms experiencing large 
positive and negative changes in relative rank produced qualitatively similar 
results.  Even for firms experiencing strong relative gains or losses in corporate 
social responsibility positioning, there was no corresponding response in the 
abnormal stock return. 
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results fail to provide any statistically reliable evidence that the 
market responds to a company’s change in relative performance 
over time.  Based on the sample data, there does not appear to be 
any conclusive evidence that markets will “discipline” firms that 
fall behind in their relative corporate social responsibility 
performance over time, nor do markets appear to reward CSR 
“improvers.”  The lack of market discipline along this dynamic 
dimension may indicate more limited potential for market 
pressures associated with corporate social responsibility to 
impose truly robust enforcement of firms’ commitments. 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
Corporate Social Responsibility is a trend that shows signs of 
becoming increasingly integrated into the business of 
transnational corporations.  The overlap between the corporate 
social responsibility activity of these firms and the goals and 
norms of public law raise questions about how effective it can be 
as a transmission mechanism for global public law norms.  The 
absence of a global public regulatory authority to enforce the 
public law commitments at the heart of the current corporate 
social responsibility movement makes the issue of its 
effectiveness as self-regulation more salient. 
One means by which corporate social responsibility 
commitments may theoretically be made effective is through the 
largely private activity of third parties who engage in 
comparative ranking and publication of the corporate social 
responsibility performance of transnational firms.  The rankings 
published by Fortune are an example of this private standard-
setting and bench-marking activity.  While the theoretical 
possibility is readily established, the question that remains open 
is whether such standards generate meaningful impacts in 
practice.  The objective of this paper is to begin to provide 
empirical evidence bearing on the practical potential of rankings 
such as Fortune’s to contribute to meaningful corporate social 
responsibility commitments by transnational firms. 
The results of the study are somewhat equivocal.  The results 
offer partial support for claims that rankings such as Fortune’s 
are treated as independent events revealing information 
significant to the value of firms.  The results also offer qualified 
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support for the proposition that corporate social responsibility 
activity is viewed by markets as enhancing the value of 
transnational firms, and that there is a positive relationship 
between relative rank and abnormal returns that would tend to 
reward good CSR performers and punish low-ranking firms.  
There is thus some indication that market response will provide 
incentives that will encourage firms to adhere to corporate social 
responsibility commitments, so that independent rankings such 
as Fortune’s can act as an alternative to traditional enforcement.  
There is some potential for third party rankings to “regulate” 
through provision of information, and some indication that 
market discipline will “enforce” corporate social responsibility 
commitments.  However, the results are not robust across event 
windows, years or model specifications addressing the relative 
ranking effect.  This leaves residual doubt about whether the 
Fortune rankings in particular, and perhaps corporate social 
responsibility rankings more generally, will have the positive 
effects that could constitute corporate social responsibility as 
global public law norms. 
One potential gap in the present study is the inability to 
break down the cross-sectional results by conditioning on the type 
of corporate social responsibility activity undertaken by the firm.  
It may be that the market only views some forms of this activity 
as profitable.  This information, while not reflected in the 
rankings themselves, would be readily available to investors 
through the same published reports that are used to calculate 
Fortune’s rankings.  Constructing measures of the specific 
corporate social responsibility focus of firms may offer a way to 
assess whether relative rank operates only in conjunction with 
the type of activity to influence the market response of investors. 
As noted in the discussion of Fortune’s rankings, each screen 
for corporate social responsibility involves a particular vision of 
corporate social responsibility by those constructing the ranking 
tool.  Rejection of robust results for one screen does not imply that 
all such screens will be ineffective in the role of quasi-public 
enforcement devices.  Comparative work that examined the cross-
sectional returns of firms conditioned on features of their 
corporate social responsibility activity and performance under 
alternative corporate social responsibility screens might help 
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establish the parameters of most critical importance to markets.  
In addition, the case study here is limited to a relatively early 
period in the rankings and it does not include responses to 
rankings from very recent years.  It is possible that, as with 
South African divestment, interest in corporate social 
responsibility performance and rankings has varied over time.152
Legal academics have begun to turn their attention to the 
potential for large multinational corporations to play a role in 
establishing and implementing norms transnationally.
 
153  This 
process is increasingly viewed as one complementary to the 
traditional mechanisms of public law in the international 
realm.154  This new approach is reflected in the emergence of 
fused private-public initiatives such as the Global Compact and 
GRI.  In order to take full advantage of the potential synergy, 
public law actors in the international realm will need to give 
attention to the priorities of markets to help harness their power 
to enforce the public law commitments made through 
transnational corporate social responsibility activity.  While the 
empirical results of this paper provide some support for the 
theory that markets can incentivize and help enforce corporate 
social responsibility commitments through third party rankings 
and disclosures, the results are not particularly robust.  Further 
empirical work examining the impact of alternative ranking 
schemes could help to answer the question of whether this 
relatively weak role for third party “informational regulation” is 
more general or just reflects disinterest in Fortune’s rankings, 
perhaps because the relevant audience has already come to 
similar conclusions about the ranked firms.155
 
 152. The increased scores of the G100 in more recent versions of the 
AccountAbillity/Fortune rankings may reflect an increased belief that corporate 
social responsibility performance is of increasing concern to consumers and 
investors.  However, changes in the ranking methodology make it difficult to be 
sure that the increased scores are really reflective of an improved level of 
performance. 
 
 153. See generally Backer, supra note 1; Affolder, supra note 1. 
 154. This is the premise behind the adoption of the UN Global Compact. 
 155. This would suggest that much of the influence of corporate responsibility 
is felt on the investor side, particularly through the channel of professional or 
institutional investors accessing firm information directly and making 
systematic comparisons on their own.  The relative impact of using popular 
media would be greater for individual investors and consumers, particularly if 
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A further cautionary note emerges from this case study.  
Amongst the “leader” firms in 2004-2006, we find companies that 
have been at the center of recent crises.  Firms that were revealed 
as particularly vulnerable in the financial crisis, including 
Citigroup, HSBC and General Motors formed part of the “leader” 
group in 2006.  Perhaps the most ironic aspect of the rankings is 
the standout performance of BP, ranked second in 2006, first in 
2005 and first in 2004.  A major aspect of the company’s 
sustainability platform was anchored in its claims of 
environmental responsibility.  In light of the recent Gulf Coast 
spill, it is clear that reputational interest and market pressure 
alone will not always produce sustainable practice.  More 
generally, it is not clear that markets will strike the same balance 
between goals of sustainability and profitability that public 
regulatory authorities would choose in the public interest. 
The results of the present study provide some qualified 
support for the idea that privately provided corporate social 
responsibility rankings can have a “regulatory” character.  To the 
extent that these private sector standard-setting and bench-
marking activities are effective, questions loom regarding their 
ability to reflect choices congruent with the public values 
underlying the private commitments.  Market-based 
informational regulation is likely to prove an incomplete 
substitute for traditional regulatory authority.  However, in the 
transnational context, it may have a potential role as a 
complementary channel for the diffusion of public law norms.  
The results from this study of Fortune’s sustainability rankings 
provide some support for this role, but suggest caution about both 
its potential strength and scope. 
 
 
there is greater diffusion of results from popular media like Fortune through 
other media channels, such as individual or NGO newsgroups, web-sites, blogs, 
etc. to individuals who would not otherwise research corporate behavior directly 
and systematically.  The lack of a robust, significant impact for the Fortune 
rankings suggests that this latter influence is not particularly strong. 
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